Team,
If you have been following the news then you are aware of the Escherichia coli, commonly referred to as E. coli, outbreak in Germany. E. Coli are bacteria found in the gastrointestinal tract of animals including humans. Most types of E. coli are harmless; however, some strains can cause fatal illness by producing toxins which can result in serious kidney complications. Since early May, the German outbreak caused 39 deaths and sickened over 3,517 people, 839 of them with life-threatening kidney disease.
German authorities initially believed that cucumbers, tomatoes, and lettuce were the sources of the outbreak. Our DoD’s executive agent for subsistence, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Troop Support, quickly removed these items from the European subsistence prime vendor contract while SIXTH Fleet immediately issued a message directing all activities in theater to either discard or properly disinfect all cucumbers, tomatoes, and lettuce with chlorine or an appropriate sanitizer. Further, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) issued a “Food Flash” to all afloat and ashore galleys advising food service officers of the problem and reiterating the direction in the SIXTH Fleet message to ensure ALCON were aware of the situation and taking the necessary precautions to prevent infection of U.S. personnel.
By 10 June, German authorities revised their assessment by identifying bean sprouts as the root cause for the E. Coli outbreak. Military food service activities were not at risk because DoD approved sources for bean sprouts do not include Germany. Again, SIXTH Fleet and NAVSUP notified all activities of the suspected E. Coli source and DLA Troop Support returned cucumbers, tomatoes, and lettuce to the subsistence prime vendor contract.
Keeping our military food safe for consumption is a critically important task since an outbreak of food borne illness can cripple a deployed ship or unit. Interestingly, since food borne diseases are animal related, the Army Veterinary Corps provides food safety and security inspections for all the Armed Services. The Army Veterinary Corps works closely with U.S. and foreign public health activities to ensure our military global subsistence supply chain is providing safe food to the warfighter.
I was very impressed with the manner in which our teams at the DLA Troop Support, NAVSUP and SIXTH Fleet rapidly responded and took control of the supply lines to protect our Service members, Civilians and their families from this very serious outbreak. I wanted to share this story with you because it is a great example of what our Sailors, Civilians, and military support organizations do every day for our Navy – but whose hard work is rarely publicly recognized.
All the best, JCHjr
21 June 2011
16 June 2011
Initiatives to Improve Maintenance Performance
Team,
As I mentioned in my Post “Keeping the Fleet in the Fight – Then and Now,” VADM Kevin McCoy (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command), RADM Thomas (Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic) and I have been working to improve our ship’s maintenance performance and achieve their expected service life through proper engineering, planning, and execution of availabilities and class maintenance plans. Although we have a long way to go, we are headed in the right direction and have set in motion a set of initiatives to get at the root problems which have caused our current challenges. Some of these initiatives are:
• Reconstituting RMC Capability and Capacity – One of our primary goals to improve surface ship maintenance is to re-establish that “virtuous training cycle” where Sailors roll ashore and receive Journeyman training which will enhance their skills and better prepare them for their next sea tour. Next year, we are adding 385 civilians and 400 military personnel with the goal of adding an additional 248 civilians and 1,187 military personnel over the next five years.
• Implementing Total Ships Readiness Assessments – TSRA is a common integrated process to plan, identify, assess, document, repair, validate ship’s Current Ship’s Maintenance Project (CSMP), validate ship’s systems configuration and provide self sufficiency maintenance training to ship‘s force with the expectation of ensuring operational availability goals are met through the execution of total ship systems operational assessments and functional verifications. TSRA will be planned and executed by the Regional Maintenance Centers on all Surface Ships.
• Established Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) – On 8 November, 2010 NAVSEA stood-up SURFMEPP which is responsible for managing the long-term maintenance requirements for ships in the surface fleet. SURFMEPP has expanded the scope of Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM) Activity and is identifying, managing, resourcing and planning the execution of the necessary technical requirements that will enable each ship to reach its expected service life. Additionally, NAVSEA will be assisting CNSL and CNSP in establishing a more robust depot maintenance management staff in the N43 directorates with embedded Availability Work Package (AWP) managers.
• Maintenance & Repair Work Certification process - To ensure work completed during CNO availabilities and CMAVs results in ‘first-time readiness’, NAVSEA is establishing a work certification process to (1) ensure work packages contain requisite content that yields a ‘warship ready for tasking’ at the completion of the availability, and (2) to ensure that proper quality assurance is built into the production and test process to avoid rework, milestone delays, cost escalation and impact on ship’s employment schedules.
• Established Workforce Development Program – Developing standardized training plans for critical maintenance team members (Project Manager, Ship Building Specialist, Assessments Coordinator, Contract Specialist, Integrated Test Coordinator, Port Engineer, and Integrated Project Team) resulting in common standards and certifications.
• Stood-up SEA 21 Readiness Task Forces – To perform coordinated, comprehensive, holistic assessments of systems and ship classes and develop recommended actions to improve readiness. For example, the MCM Class Task Force identified 51 actions to improve the readiness of our MCM force and those actions are currently being implemented throughout the Fleet.
• Improving Corrosion Control – Effective Corrosion Control is one of the most fundamental components to maintaining our platforms. We currently have Corrosion Control Assistance Teams (CCAT) supporting Norfolk, Little Creek, and Mayport and are establishing CCAT support on the West Coast and our Forward Deployed Naval Forces in Japan. We are also implementing corrosion control fundamentals training for all-hands training on our ships. Developing a plan for large scale testing of improved corrosion control technologies to bring the latest coatings and materials from industry to our surface ships.
• Improving Deck-plate Material Readiness and Sailor Proficiency - NAVSEA 21 and CNRMC are deploying maintenance assistance teams and systems readiness teams to train Sailors in safe equipment operations and PMS execution. NAVSEA is capturing the experience from these engagements to improve PMS products, technical schoolhouse training, equipment maintenance strategies, sparing/COSAL and technical documentation. Noteworthy efforts have been in the areas of AEGIS/SPY System Alignment and Groom Teams (SAGT), Valve Maintenance Assistance Teams (VMAT), Deck University, and Auxiliaries Maintenance Assistance Teams (AMAT).
• System Sustainment - NAVSEA has been building lifecycle sustainment capability for shipboard systems and equipment to ensure that their material condition is regularly monitored (Distance Support); that meaningful system health metrics are captured; their maintenance strategies and technical training content are correct; that equipment obsolescence is proactively managed; and that logistic documentation is accurate and current.
• Single Surface Training Integrator (SSTI) – Following a best practice used in the submarine community, NAVSEA has established PMS 339, Single Surface Training Integrator, to act as the Navy’s program manager for Sailor technical training for all shipboard systems. PMS 339 will fuse technical training requirements and validate them through various OPNAV sponsor shops and execute technical training budgets assigned to them. The intent is to have clear and unambiguous accountability for the effectiveness of Sailor technical training for the life of a system (‘cradle to grave’).
These are just a few of the initiatives that ADM Walsh, VADM McCoy, VADM Hunt, RADM Thomas, and I are executing to improve our surface ship maintenance; many of them are temporary initiatives focused on re-establishing fundamental processes and identifying programs and processes that are ineffective and need to be eliminated.
As I have mentioned in the past, we established many organizations and processes over time which never got after the fundamentals. For example, one of the lessons we learned with LPD-17 was that we did not have a comprehensive electronic database or paper Equipment Deficiency Log (EDL) to track propulsion plant deficiencies. With all of the BoDs, EXCOMMs, Oversight Councils, Enterprise Initiatives, afloat applications, and Integrated Readiness Teams, we didn’t have a simple mechanism in place to accurately track the current status of USS SAN ANTONIO’s propulsion plant…
These initiatives above are not about “reinventing the wheel,” but are focused on doing what we know from 235 years of experience works – proper engineering, effective maintenance planning and execution, accurate assessment, accurate record keeping, steady application of sufficient resources, and effective maintenance training focused on maintaining our standards of operational readiness.
All the best, JCHjr
As I mentioned in my Post “Keeping the Fleet in the Fight – Then and Now,” VADM Kevin McCoy (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command), RADM Thomas (Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic) and I have been working to improve our ship’s maintenance performance and achieve their expected service life through proper engineering, planning, and execution of availabilities and class maintenance plans. Although we have a long way to go, we are headed in the right direction and have set in motion a set of initiatives to get at the root problems which have caused our current challenges. Some of these initiatives are:
• Reconstituting RMC Capability and Capacity – One of our primary goals to improve surface ship maintenance is to re-establish that “virtuous training cycle” where Sailors roll ashore and receive Journeyman training which will enhance their skills and better prepare them for their next sea tour. Next year, we are adding 385 civilians and 400 military personnel with the goal of adding an additional 248 civilians and 1,187 military personnel over the next five years.
• Implementing Total Ships Readiness Assessments – TSRA is a common integrated process to plan, identify, assess, document, repair, validate ship’s Current Ship’s Maintenance Project (CSMP), validate ship’s systems configuration and provide self sufficiency maintenance training to ship‘s force with the expectation of ensuring operational availability goals are met through the execution of total ship systems operational assessments and functional verifications. TSRA will be planned and executed by the Regional Maintenance Centers on all Surface Ships.
• Established Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) – On 8 November, 2010 NAVSEA stood-up SURFMEPP which is responsible for managing the long-term maintenance requirements for ships in the surface fleet. SURFMEPP has expanded the scope of Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM) Activity and is identifying, managing, resourcing and planning the execution of the necessary technical requirements that will enable each ship to reach its expected service life. Additionally, NAVSEA will be assisting CNSL and CNSP in establishing a more robust depot maintenance management staff in the N43 directorates with embedded Availability Work Package (AWP) managers.
• Maintenance & Repair Work Certification process - To ensure work completed during CNO availabilities and CMAVs results in ‘first-time readiness’, NAVSEA is establishing a work certification process to (1) ensure work packages contain requisite content that yields a ‘warship ready for tasking’ at the completion of the availability, and (2) to ensure that proper quality assurance is built into the production and test process to avoid rework, milestone delays, cost escalation and impact on ship’s employment schedules.
• Established Workforce Development Program – Developing standardized training plans for critical maintenance team members (Project Manager, Ship Building Specialist, Assessments Coordinator, Contract Specialist, Integrated Test Coordinator, Port Engineer, and Integrated Project Team) resulting in common standards and certifications.
• Stood-up SEA 21 Readiness Task Forces – To perform coordinated, comprehensive, holistic assessments of systems and ship classes and develop recommended actions to improve readiness. For example, the MCM Class Task Force identified 51 actions to improve the readiness of our MCM force and those actions are currently being implemented throughout the Fleet.
• Improving Corrosion Control – Effective Corrosion Control is one of the most fundamental components to maintaining our platforms. We currently have Corrosion Control Assistance Teams (CCAT) supporting Norfolk, Little Creek, and Mayport and are establishing CCAT support on the West Coast and our Forward Deployed Naval Forces in Japan. We are also implementing corrosion control fundamentals training for all-hands training on our ships. Developing a plan for large scale testing of improved corrosion control technologies to bring the latest coatings and materials from industry to our surface ships.
• Improving Deck-plate Material Readiness and Sailor Proficiency - NAVSEA 21 and CNRMC are deploying maintenance assistance teams and systems readiness teams to train Sailors in safe equipment operations and PMS execution. NAVSEA is capturing the experience from these engagements to improve PMS products, technical schoolhouse training, equipment maintenance strategies, sparing/COSAL and technical documentation. Noteworthy efforts have been in the areas of AEGIS/SPY System Alignment and Groom Teams (SAGT), Valve Maintenance Assistance Teams (VMAT), Deck University, and Auxiliaries Maintenance Assistance Teams (AMAT).
• System Sustainment - NAVSEA has been building lifecycle sustainment capability for shipboard systems and equipment to ensure that their material condition is regularly monitored (Distance Support); that meaningful system health metrics are captured; their maintenance strategies and technical training content are correct; that equipment obsolescence is proactively managed; and that logistic documentation is accurate and current.
• Single Surface Training Integrator (SSTI) – Following a best practice used in the submarine community, NAVSEA has established PMS 339, Single Surface Training Integrator, to act as the Navy’s program manager for Sailor technical training for all shipboard systems. PMS 339 will fuse technical training requirements and validate them through various OPNAV sponsor shops and execute technical training budgets assigned to them. The intent is to have clear and unambiguous accountability for the effectiveness of Sailor technical training for the life of a system (‘cradle to grave’).
These are just a few of the initiatives that ADM Walsh, VADM McCoy, VADM Hunt, RADM Thomas, and I are executing to improve our surface ship maintenance; many of them are temporary initiatives focused on re-establishing fundamental processes and identifying programs and processes that are ineffective and need to be eliminated.
As I have mentioned in the past, we established many organizations and processes over time which never got after the fundamentals. For example, one of the lessons we learned with LPD-17 was that we did not have a comprehensive electronic database or paper Equipment Deficiency Log (EDL) to track propulsion plant deficiencies. With all of the BoDs, EXCOMMs, Oversight Councils, Enterprise Initiatives, afloat applications, and Integrated Readiness Teams, we didn’t have a simple mechanism in place to accurately track the current status of USS SAN ANTONIO’s propulsion plant…
These initiatives above are not about “reinventing the wheel,” but are focused on doing what we know from 235 years of experience works – proper engineering, effective maintenance planning and execution, accurate assessment, accurate record keeping, steady application of sufficient resources, and effective maintenance training focused on maintaining our standards of operational readiness.
All the best, JCHjr
10 June 2011
USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) and USS NEW YORK (LPD 21)
Team,
I want to share a few photos with you of USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) as she’s steaming alongside USS NEW YORK (LPD 21) in the Virginia Capes operating area to complete the second half of her extensive sea trials period. She's focusing on shiphandling drills, combat systems testing, and increasing crew proficiency. Her crew is working hard and making steady progress towards our goal of returning her to unrestricted operations with the Fleet. These ships have immense capabilities that bring great flexibility and depth to the Navy-Marine Corps team.
All the best, JCHjr
I want to share a few photos with you of USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) as she’s steaming alongside USS NEW YORK (LPD 21) in the Virginia Capes operating area to complete the second half of her extensive sea trials period. She's focusing on shiphandling drills, combat systems testing, and increasing crew proficiency. Her crew is working hard and making steady progress towards our goal of returning her to unrestricted operations with the Fleet. These ships have immense capabilities that bring great flexibility and depth to the Navy-Marine Corps team.
All the best, JCHjr
Atlantic Ocean (June 09, 2011) USS San Antonio (LPD 17) and USS New York (LPD 21) steam alongside while operating together in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Virginia. San Antonio conducted shiphandling drills with New York during San Antonio's second phase of sea trials, which is primarily focused on combat systems testing and developing crew proficiency. (US Navy Photos by MC1 (SW/AW) Edwin F. Bryan)
09 June 2011
Bold Alligator 2012 Update
Team,
After Bold Alligator 2011 - last year’s successful large scale, synthetic amphibious training exercise – we incorporated the lessons learned and quickly began planning for Bold Alligator 2012 (BA12).
BA12, tentatively scheduled for early in 2012, will be the largest amphibious exercise conducted by the Navy and Marine Corps in the last ten years. While planning is ongoing, it currently includes:
-An Amphibious Task Force (ESG-2) consisting of two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs—7-8 ships) and a Naval Beach Group (NBG)
-A Marine Expeditionary Brigade-sized Landing Force (2d MEB) consisting of a complete Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a Regimental Landing Team (RLT), a Marine Air Group (MAG) and a Combat Logistics Regiment (CLR)
-A Carrier Strike Group (CSG-aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, 3-4 surface combatants)
-Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships
-Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) forces
-Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) forces
-Joint supporting forces
-Coalition amphibious, landing, and MCM forces
As the list of participants indicates, an amphibious mission of this size is not simply the purview of the amphibious forces and the Marines—it is a joint, multi-national, and naval endeavor requiring the full attention of the Fleet and Marine components at both the operational and tactical levels of war. Projecting power from the sea is a NAVAL core competency. Integrated forces conduct of operations from the blue water, into the seaward side of the littoral, and ultimately to the depth of objectives ashore.
There has been a great deal of recent commentary on whether we have seen the end of large-scale amphibious operations. However, this was exactly the state of affairs before the Korean War in 1950, before the Falklands conflict of 1982 and before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Each of these crises required planning for and, in two cases, executing large scale amphibious assaults. Especially in this volatile era, we cannot know with certainty that we will not have to gain access to an operational area to project and sustain a sizable landing force ashore. The adversary will probably not be a conventional military, but state or non-state entities with competent anti-access and area denial “hybrid” capabilities—that can disrupt our operations at sea, in the air, and on land. The Navy and Marine Corps have the legislated responsibilities to be able to conduct these operations.
At its core, BA12 is a training exercise to ensure that the units presently assigned to USFF and Marine Corps Forces Command have the capability to plan and execute these operations—how we do this with the forces we have today.
In June 1944, allied forces carried out two large amphibious operations on opposite sides of the globe. The Overlord invasion of France, and the Forager operation to seize the Marianas were similar in many respects. The building blocks of aircraft, ships, and ground forces were all generally the same. But these two operations were also significantly different in operational and tactical organizations and approaches. These differences were shaped by the unique environment of each operation. Our future amphibious operations will likewise have to adapt our basic tactical elements to operate in new and innovative ways.
In this spirit, BA12 is also an experiment. It is not an experiment in the sense of testing new technologies or equipment, but in the broadest sense of the term. Hearkening back to the Fleet Battle Experiments before World War II, where the Navy and Marines developed the tactics and techniques that carried our forces across oceans and onto foreign shores, BA12 will provide an opportunity to combine our current capabilities in new ways to address the challenges we face. Revitalizing our amphibious competencies does not mean conducting the operation as we did in 1942, 1950, 1990, or even 2000, but how we would do it now, with the current joint and naval operating concepts.
All the best, JCHjr.
After Bold Alligator 2011 - last year’s successful large scale, synthetic amphibious training exercise – we incorporated the lessons learned and quickly began planning for Bold Alligator 2012 (BA12).
BA12, tentatively scheduled for early in 2012, will be the largest amphibious exercise conducted by the Navy and Marine Corps in the last ten years. While planning is ongoing, it currently includes:
-An Amphibious Task Force (ESG-2) consisting of two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs—7-8 ships) and a Naval Beach Group (NBG)
-A Marine Expeditionary Brigade-sized Landing Force (2d MEB) consisting of a complete Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a Regimental Landing Team (RLT), a Marine Air Group (MAG) and a Combat Logistics Regiment (CLR)
-A Carrier Strike Group (CSG-aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, 3-4 surface combatants)
-Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships
-Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) forces
-Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) forces
-Joint supporting forces
-Coalition amphibious, landing, and MCM forces
As the list of participants indicates, an amphibious mission of this size is not simply the purview of the amphibious forces and the Marines—it is a joint, multi-national, and naval endeavor requiring the full attention of the Fleet and Marine components at both the operational and tactical levels of war. Projecting power from the sea is a NAVAL core competency. Integrated forces conduct of operations from the blue water, into the seaward side of the littoral, and ultimately to the depth of objectives ashore.
There has been a great deal of recent commentary on whether we have seen the end of large-scale amphibious operations. However, this was exactly the state of affairs before the Korean War in 1950, before the Falklands conflict of 1982 and before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Each of these crises required planning for and, in two cases, executing large scale amphibious assaults. Especially in this volatile era, we cannot know with certainty that we will not have to gain access to an operational area to project and sustain a sizable landing force ashore. The adversary will probably not be a conventional military, but state or non-state entities with competent anti-access and area denial “hybrid” capabilities—that can disrupt our operations at sea, in the air, and on land. The Navy and Marine Corps have the legislated responsibilities to be able to conduct these operations.
At its core, BA12 is a training exercise to ensure that the units presently assigned to USFF and Marine Corps Forces Command have the capability to plan and execute these operations—how we do this with the forces we have today.
In June 1944, allied forces carried out two large amphibious operations on opposite sides of the globe. The Overlord invasion of France, and the Forager operation to seize the Marianas were similar in many respects. The building blocks of aircraft, ships, and ground forces were all generally the same. But these two operations were also significantly different in operational and tactical organizations and approaches. These differences were shaped by the unique environment of each operation. Our future amphibious operations will likewise have to adapt our basic tactical elements to operate in new and innovative ways.
In this spirit, BA12 is also an experiment. It is not an experiment in the sense of testing new technologies or equipment, but in the broadest sense of the term. Hearkening back to the Fleet Battle Experiments before World War II, where the Navy and Marines developed the tactics and techniques that carried our forces across oceans and onto foreign shores, BA12 will provide an opportunity to combine our current capabilities in new ways to address the challenges we face. Revitalizing our amphibious competencies does not mean conducting the operation as we did in 1942, 1950, 1990, or even 2000, but how we would do it now, with the current joint and naval operating concepts.
All the best, JCHjr.
03 June 2011
New York City Fleet Week
Team,
Last weekend I had the privilege to participate in New York City's 24th Fleet Week with the Coast Guard, our Sailors and our Marines. The timing of this event (in conjunction with Memorial Day), its location (the best liberty port in the U.S.) and the people of New York City (8 million strong with a singular mission to make every person in uniform feel like a hero) combine to make this extraordinary event a truly unforgettable experience.
Just like the first New York City Fleet Week in 1984, we celebrated the accomplishments of our great nation; reaffirmed the strong bond between the public and their military; thanked the public for their unflinching support of our Navy, through thick and thin; and most important, we fulfilled our solemn duty to remember those who paid the ultimate price for their service in the defense of our freedom. On Memorial Day 1984, we honored the 220 Marines, 18 Sailors and 3 Soldiers killed by terrorists on 23 October 1983 in Beirut.
In 2011 we honored the 1571 service men and women who have died since 9/11 fighting terrorism in Afghanistan...as well as the thousands of victims of 9/11 and the first responders who walked into the flames of the World Trade Center and didn't make it back out.
In 1984 and at each of the following 23 Fleet Weeks, by honoring those who died for us, we resolve to increase our devotion to the cause for which they gave their last full measure of devotion.
All the best, JCHjr
New York City Fleet Week Memorial Day Speech (link)
Thanks from the Navy New York Post Article (link)
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