Our Global Navy

Team,
Whenever I think about our Navy and what we deliver for our nation, the same three words always come to mind – READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT. Recent events in Libya demonstrate the fundamental truth of those words.

With very little advance notice, our ships and aircraft were placed in position to deliver effects ashore in support of our national objectives, from Tomahawk strikes to knock down the Libyan air defense network to launching the quick reaction TRAP mission from KEARSARGE to rescue downed aviators.

At the very same time, half a world away, the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet is leading the effort delivering humanitarian aid and disaster relief to Japan in response to the devastating earthquake and tsunami as well as providing assistance in recovering from the nuclear accidents that occurred in the wake of the natural disasters. The same words apply in relief efforts for Japan – our naval forces were READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT.

The types of ships we’re using for those vastly different missions are very similar – Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine forces, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers capable of launching Tomahawks or helos with food and water, and MSC ships supplying the logistics support to keep our ships at sea indefinitely. Built into our ships is the flexibility and agility to respond to a wide variety of missions enabled by the fundamental fact that our Navy is truly expeditionary and routinely forward-deployed around the globe.

Think about what else is going on in addition to Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and Operation TOMODACHI – we have two Carrier Strike Groups in the NAVCENT AOR supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, our SSBN force is deployed to the Atlantic and Pacific conducting strategic nuclear deterrent patrols (as they have for over 50 years), USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7) is deployed in support of PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2011 to sustain our strategic relationships with a host of nations in the South and South West Pacific Ocean areas, USS STEPHEN W. GROVES (FFG 29) and USS ROBERT G. BRADLEY (FFG 49) are deployed in support of Africa Partnership Station and the USNS COMFORT will soon depart Norfolk in support of Operation CONTINUING PROMISE to conduct a wide array of humanitarian operations and partner capacity building exercises throughout Central and South America.

Our Navy – a global force, routinely forward-deployed and inherently expeditionary – executing the key tenets of our Maritime Strategy every day.

Our Navy – a READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT force – able to operate across the spectrum of conflict because of the professionalism, initiative and quality of our PEOPLE.

And now our challenge – sustaining this expeditionary capability to respond globally, rapidly and effectively to whatever mission comes our way. We must ensure our ships, submarines and aircraft are well-maintained, our magazines and parts lockers are full, and our Sailors are well-trained despite the nation’s ongoing fiscal crisis and the inevitable impact this crisis will have on our operations and maintenance funding over the next three years.

Just as our Sailors and our forces are up to the missions they’ve been given, so must we be up to the challenge to sustain our Navy into the future and ensure we remain READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT in this chaotic and violent world.
All the best, JCHjr

War of 1812 Bicentennial Commemoration

Team,
Next year marks the start of the Bicentennial Commemoration of the War of 1812. Our Navy is partnering with non-profit organizations and cities around the nation to put together a commemoration program that will celebrate and honor our contribution to the war and the lasting impact it has had on our Navy and our nation. This commemoration program will not only educate the public on the importance of our Navy’s contribution to the war, but will also demonstrate – through Fleet Weeks, Navy Weeks and other special events – the great talent and capability of our Sailors today.

In keeping with our Navy’s commitment to commemorate the War of 1812 and preserve our rich history, I intend to establish a drumbeat on this blog where we can discuss key battles and events and the lesser known facts that I believe shaped the war and in many cases have had a lasting effect on our Navy and nation.

I personally find the War of 1812 to be a very interesting part of our history and look forward to discussing it with you. It’s a war widely known as the “second war of independence” during which our undersized military took on the world’s largest empire and greatest Navy. From USS CONSTITUTION’s (“Old Ironsides”) defeat of HMS Guerriere to the Battle of Baltimore (which inspired our national anthem), to the Battle of New Orleans, our Navy scored decisive victories that continue to inspire us today.

But along with the tales of triumph and glory, there are those of serious economic challenges, military defeat and political division so severe that it threatened to break apart our young nation.
When we declared war on Britain in 1812, our nation had an Army of less than 10,000 and a Navy with 16 ships; we were in a deep economic depression – an unintended consequence of the Embargo Act of 1807 – that was crippling our economy and threatening the livelihood of our nation; and there was a strong minority in Congress staunchly opposed to war with the British Empire. We were clearly unprepared to take on the world’s greatest navy of 1,500 war vessels manned with the battle-hardened Officers and Sailors of the Royal Navy. In fact, the United States was viewed merely as a distraction for Britain, whose real focus was on defeating Napoleon’s France. But our Congress mustered the votes, issued the declaration for “Mr. Madison’s War” on 18 June 1812 and we went to war with what we had.

I look forward to digging into the war’s key battles and discussing the Great Lakes Fleet, our strategy of using American Privateers (who captured over 500 British vessels from 1813-14) and even some of the peculiarities of the war; such as, our greatest and arguably most impactful land battle of the time (New Orleans) which occurred two weeks after we had signed the Treaty of Ghent ending the war (poor communications can also be attributed to the start of the war). The outcome of the battle had absolutely no impact on the war, but was significant because it instilled in our nation a renewed sense of nationalism and pride.
There is much that I look forward to talking about and certainly hope you will join in the discussion.
Stay tuned for updates on the War of 1812 Bicentennial Commemoration.
All the best, JCHjr

USS OREGON (BB 3) – A Remarkable Voyage

Team,

This Saturday (19 March) marks the 113th anniversary of the beginning of what would become one of the most historic and epic voyages ever to be undertaken by a U.S. Navy warship. It was a journey that would test the resolve and determination of every Sailor on board and mark the time when our “New Navy” would begin its legitimate rise as a global naval power.

In early 1898, tensions between the United States and Spain were high as Spanish-controlled Cuba was in the midst of a bloody revolution. President McKinley deployed the USS MAINE to Havana harbor as show of concern for the violent demonstrations that had swept Havana and to evacuate Americans should the need arise.

On the evening of 15 February 1898 the MAINE suddenly erupted into a massive explosion and rapidly sank to the bottom of the harbor, taking 260 of her crew with her. Although the cause of the explosion has never been determined (there are several theories), the event was enough to push an enraged American public over the edge and serve as a catalyst (but not the primary reason) for the war with Spain.

As war with Spain was imminent, the USS OREGON (BB 3) was ordered from the west coast of the United States to Jupiter Inlet, Florida where she would join Admiral William T. Sampson’s fleet in the Atlantic. The Panama Canal did not exist at the time so the shortest route by sea would be down the west coast of the United States, past Central and South America, through the straits of Magellan, and then back up the coastline to her destination in Florida. It was an arduous 14,000+ mile journey that was certain to be fraught with great challenges.

Shortly before she was to sail, OREGON’s commanding officer became ill and was replaced by CAPT Charles Clark of the monitor USS MONTEREY. CAPT Clark took command of OREGON and on 19 March 1898, with a shortage of 94 men in the crew of 473, got underway from San Francisco and set a course of due south for Callao, Peru, her first coaling stop.

The Chief Engineer of the ship, Robert W. Milligan, informed CAPT Clark the supply of fresh water was not adequate to feed the boilers and the crew…there would have to be some tough decisions. Using seawater in the boilers would cause them to operate less efficiently and thus add time to an already long and critical journey – an unacceptable outcome. The alternative, according to Chief Milligan, was to save the fresh, cool water for the boilers and supply the crew with the warm feed water from the boilers. CAPT Clark called his crew together, informed them of the situation and the CHENG’s recommendation and found them all to be overwhelmingly supportive of the idea – a true commitment to the mission!

OREGON made it to Callao, Peru on 4 April, to replenish coal and supplies. While in Peru she learned that the TEMERARIO, a Spanish torpedo boat, was in the general vicinity but her precise whereabouts and intentions were unknown. At this point, the United States and Spain were on the verge of war and CAPT Clark instructed his crew to be extra vigilant during their watches as they set out from Callao. While at sea, there was no way of knowing if war had indeed broken out, so every encounter with a foreign vessel – especially Spanish ships – needed to be treated with the utmost caution.
OREGON proceeded to her next destination of Rio de Janeiro which took her through the treacherous Straits of Magellan where, with Murphy’s Law in full effect, she encountered an incredible gale that threatened to run her aground. CAPT Clark dropped anchors until the gale passed and on 16 April began navigating the Straits. After a few days that included a brief stop in Punta Arenas, she had cleared the Straits, made it to the Atlantic, and was making best speed to her destination in Florida.

OREGON finally reached Rio de Janeiro on 30 April where CAPT Clark would have several exchanges with Washington which finally culminated with his message "Don't hamper me with instructions. I am not afraid, with this ship, of the whole Spanish fleet." To understand and appreciate CAPT Clark’s message, it’s important to understand the environment back in the States. The United States had declared war on Spain and news had just broken of Admiral Dewey’s decisive victory at Manila Bay. Needless to say, there was much excitement in the air. The press corps and American public had learned of OREGON’s mission and had started following every update with great interest. In the wake of the MAINE, OREGON had become a symbol of resilience and power to the American public. And while OREGON’s crew welcomed the news of Manila Bay, CAPT Clark needed to keep them focused on executing their mission. The messages from Washington were only causing confusion and risked leaking his location and orders to Spanish spies.

So on 4 May, OREGON weighed anchor and steamed out of Rio de Janeiro with her guns manned in the event she encountered any Spanish ships. After a brief stop in Bahia, Brazil she arrived in Bridgetown, Barbados for a final resupply of coal. While in Bridgetown, the American Consul (unlawfully) transmitted a cable to Washington informing HQ that OREGON had arrived. This transmission (a major OPSEC breakdown) turned out to be a significant issue as Barbados was a neutral country and was thus required by law to permit the Spanish Consul to transmit a similar message of their own. As you can expect, CAPT Clark was greatly concerned, as he anticipated the Spanish Consul would certainly inform their government of his presence in port. OREGON got underway that evening and left port on a course fully illuminated to make her direction apparent to anyone watching. As she approached the horizon, CAPT Clark ordered her lights extinguished and abruptly changed course under the cover of darkness.

On 24 May 1898, CAPT Clark and the crew of USS OREGON steamed into Jupiter Inlet, Florida and completed the final leg of one of the most challenging voyages ever undertaken by a warship. She had completed the 14,000+ mile journey in just 66 days – a remarkable feat! For the entire journey, the “black gang” below decks worked non-stop around the clock feeding her voracious boilers with ten tons of coal per hour, with the only tools they had – two hands and a shovel!

Furthermore, throughout the entire journey, CAPT Clark, on the advice of his experienced and well-trained CHENG, had preserved his best coal, Welsh anthracite, for use in battle. OREGON arrived on station, with all engines steaming, completely combat ready. She had certainly earned her nickname “McKinley’s Bulldog” and set standards for professional competence, engineering excellence and dedication to duty that we follow today.

In July, we’ll take a look at the Battle of Santiago during which OREGON delivered the decisive blow to Admiral Cervera’s fleet.

All the best, JCHjr

DRRS-N Update

Team,

In my last DRRS-N update to you in November, I emphasized the importance of timely and accurate reporting at the unit level. I also talked about the importance of drawing from lessons learned in the Fleet and feeding them back through the chain-of-command (the feedback loop).
Since that update, there have been several substantial changes. Most notable is that I have consolidated the DRRS-N responsibilities under a single, accountable person who now reports directly to me as a Special Assistant. This move was necessary in order to give DRRS-N the direct attention it needs (by me and my Special Assistant).

Now, it was apparent to me from the time we transitioned to DRRS-N that it was a work in progress, but the more I learned over the past four months, the more I became convinced it was not meeting the needs of our Type Commanders. Our ability to provide forces ready for tasking depends on Type Commanders having a clear and accurate view of their units’ operational readiness. When Commanders view a unit in DRRS-N, there should be no doubt in their mind that what they are seeing is based on fact and in no way differs from what they see when they visit the unit in person. On the contrary, I’ve found that there is too often a significant discrepancy between what DRRS-N tells me and the reality I find…and that is simply unacceptable.

To that end, I directed my DRRS-N Special Assistant, CAPT Skip Shaw, to develop a comprehensive plan to fix the operational issues in DRRS-N and get the program on the right path for long-term sustainment. Specifically, CAPT Shaw will be working with the TYCOMs to reduce complexity, institutionalize standards for the Commander’s Assessment, train the Fleet (a very important one!), and eventually transition the program management functions to an appropriate SYSCOM. (See attached slides for details)
I have also directed CAPT Shaw to work directly with my Type Commanders to ensure DRRS-N is accurately reporting their units’ readiness based on their standards.

Although we have much work to do on DRRS-N, I believe we have the right people in place with the right plan to get it done; we’re already seeing some improvements. SURFLANT has made great progress reducing the complexity for the end user by reducing the number of tasks they report against by up to half for some ship classes (e.g. DDGs). SUBLANT established an in-house DRRS-N Tiger Team and they’ve already started putting together a “DRRS-N for Dummies”-type guide that will help everyone, especially me! As you see, there is no shortage of advantages from working together on this…we all benefit from collaboration, coordination and communication.
All the best, JCHjr

Bold Alligator 2012 Reading Program

Team,
The message below captures my intent with Bold Alligator 2012 (BA 12) as well as establishes the personal reading program I will complete over the coming year to refresh my knowledge and build on my understanding of amphibious operations history, doctrine, and tactics. While not mandatory, I believe this reading list forms the basis of a strong professional reading program, regardless of the level of your participation in BA 12, and so I encourage you to read some or all of my recommendations below and discuss your observations with me here.
You can read the message below or download a copy here.
All the best, JCHjr

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FM COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//N00//
TO ALFLTFORCOM
BT
UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICERS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEFS FROM ADM HARVEY
SECINFO/-/-//MSGID/GENADMIN/COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA/N00/MAR//SUBJ/AMPHIBIOUS AND EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS READING PROGRAM//GENTEXT/REMARKS/
A LARGE-SCALE OPERATION TO EXERCISE THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS' ABILITY TO CONDUCT PROMPT AND SUSTAINED AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA, A FUNDAMENTAL CORE COMPETENCY FOR US, HAS NOT OCCURRED IN THE LAST TEN YEARS BECAUSE OF OUR FOCUS ON OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CORE COMPETENCY NOR THE FACT THAT THIS COMPETENCY IS AND ALWAYS WILL BE A UNIQUE CAPABILITY DELIVERED BY THE NAVY/MARINE CORPS TEAM.

2. TO THAT END, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT EXERCISE BOLD ALLIGATOR SERVE AS OUR PRIMARY OPERATIONAL ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE FOR THIS YEAR TO CULMINATE IN BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 (BA 12), WHICH WILL BE THE LARGEST PAGE 02 RUCBCLF0050 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE CONDUCTED BY THE FLEET IN THE LAST TEN YEARS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS EXERCISE IS TO REVISIT NAVY/MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES AND REINVIGORATE OUR CULTURE OF CONDUCTING COMBINED NAVY/MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT BA 12 WILL BE A MAJOR FLEET EXERCISE, NOT SIMPLY ANOTHER ARG/MEU EVENT.

3. AS WE BEGIN PLANNING FOR BA 12, IT IS APPARENT TO ME THAT OUR COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, WHICH CERTAINLY INCLUDES MY KNOWLEDGE, OF AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS HAS ERODED OVER TIME. TO ENSURE I AM FULLY READY FOR BA 12, I HAVE ESTABLISHED A PERSONAL READING PROGRAM THAT I ENCOURAGE YOU TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AS WELL FOR YOUR OWN BENEFIT AND THAT OF YOUR UNIT. THIS READING LIST IS VOLUNTARY, AND WILL NOT BE MADE MANDATORY, BUT I TRULY BELIEVE IT CAN FORM THE BASIS OF A STRONG PROFESSIONAL READING PROGRAM, REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN BA 12. MY READING PROGRAM CONTAINS FOUR BOOKS THAT CAN BE READ WITHIN A YEAR WITH ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDED READINGS FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS.

3.A. CORE LIST: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN A MODERN ENVIRONMENT

3.A.1. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02 (JP 3-02) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (10 AUG 2009) JP 3-02 IS THE CURRENT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THIS DOCTRINE PROVIDES THE FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR READING SUBSEQUENT BOOKS ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND THEIR HISTORY. READERS SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

3.A.1.A. ASK YOURSELF HOW YOUR UNIT, COMMAND OR SPECIALTY FITS INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MARITIME INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS? HOW WOULD AN AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE TIE INTO A CARRIER STRIKE GROUP AND EXECUTE COMPOSITE WARFARE?
3.A.1.B. READ WITH AN EYE TOWARDS HOW THIS DOCTRINE FITS IN WITH OVERALL JFMCC/FLEET DOCTRINE AS CONTAINED IN JP 3-32 COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS AND NWP 3-32 MARITIME OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.

3.A.2. THE 1982 FALKLANDS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA FEATURED AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY A MODERN MARITIME FORCE UNDER A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FROM CONVENTIONAL AIR-DELIVERED ORDNANCE WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE AOA. WHILE TECHNOLOGY HAS ADVANCED SINCE 1982, MANY OF THE WARFIGHTING ISSUES WE FACE TODAY ARE SIMILIAR IN NATURE TO WHAT THE UK FORCES FACED WHILE PROJECTING FORCES ASHORE AT THE END OF A LONG AND COMPLEX LOGISTICAL PIPELINE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. BELOW ARE MEMOIRS BY THE THREE CRITICAL UK MARITIME COMMANDERS IN THIS CONFLICT - READ THESE THREE BOOKS AND COMPARE THE PERSPECTIVES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM EACH. ADDITIONALLY, READ WITH AN EYE TOWARDS HOW A U.S. MARITIME FORCE WOULD ORGANIZE AND OPERATE AGAINST AN UPDATED THREAT THAT WAS AS RELATIVELY DANGEROUS TO OUR FORCE AS THE ARGENTINEANS WERE TO THE BRITISH IN 1982.

3.A.2.A. WOODWARD, SANDY. ONE HUNDRED DAYS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER.
3.A.2.B. CLAPP, MICHAEL, AND SOUTHBY-TAYLOUR, EWEN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FALKLANDS: THE BATTLE OF SAN CARLOS WATER
3.A.2.C. THOMPSON, JULIAN. NO PICNIC: 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE IN THE FALKLANDS.

3.B. SECONDARY SELECTIONS: THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF BOOKS WILL BROADEN READERS UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AREAS.

3.B.1. DIVERSE AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS: WWII ACTUALLY SAW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THREE GENERAL MODELS FOR U.S. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE U.S. MARINES AND NAVY IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC; THE U.S. ARMY AND NAVY IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC; AND THE ALLIED COALITION IN EUROPE. OUR CURRENT DOCTRINE DERIVES MAINLY FROM THE USMC-USN CAMPAIGNS IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. HOWEVER, THE U.S. ARMY CONDUCTED MORE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN WWII THAN DID THE MARINES. TOGETHER WITH THE NAVY, THE ARMY DEVELOPED APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES IN THEIR THEATERS THAT ARE NOT CAPTURED IN CURRENT DOCTRINE, BUT ARE CERTAINLY WORTH REVIEWING CLOSELY AND CONSIDERING, IN UPDATED FORM, THEIR APPLICABILITY TODAY. THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE A GOOD BACKGROUND OF THESE UNIQUE APPROACHES TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS:

3.B.1.A. ISELY, JETER A., AND PHILIP A. CROWL. THE U.S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS WAR: ITS THEORY, AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PACIFIC.
3.B.1.B. YUNG, CHRISTOPHER D. GATORS OF NEPTUNE: NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING FOR THE NORMANDY INVASION.
3.B.1.C. BARBEY, DANIEL E., VICE ADMIRAL USN (RET). MACARTHURS AMPHIBIOUS NAVY: SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE OPERATIONS, 1943-1945.

3.B.2. THE FOLLOWING TWO BOOKS PROVIDE BASIC LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS IN THE DIFFERENT THEATERS IN WWII.

3.B.2.A. ROTTMAN, GORDON L. U.S. WORLD WAR II AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS: MEDITERRANEAN & EUROPEAN THEATERS.
3.B.2.B. ROTTMAN, GORDON L. U.S. WORLD WAR II AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS: ARMY & MARINE CORPS, PACIFIC THEATER.

3.B.3. ANALYZING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, USING BROAD SETS OF CASE STUDIES TO DERIVE THEIR CONCLUSIONS.

3.B.3.A. EVANS, MICHAEL. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE PROJECTION OF SEA POWER ASHORE.
3.B.3.B. GATCHEL, THEODORE L. AT THE WATER'S EDGE: DEFENDING AGAINST THE MODERN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT.
3.B.3.C. GATCHEL, THEODORE L. EAGLES AND ALLIGATORS; AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES DURING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 1-97).

3.B.4. OVERVIEW HISTORIES. THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE BROAD HISTORIES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT.

3.B.4.A. MESSINA, BARRY P. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. JOINT AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE, 1898-1945. (CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, SEPT 1994).
3.B.4.B. BARTLETT, MERRILL L. ASSAULT FROM THE SEA: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE.
3.B.4.C. ALEXANDER, JOSEPH H., AND MERRILL L. BARTLETT. SEA SOLDIERS IN THE COLD WAR: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 1945-1991.

4. UNDERSTANDING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND TACTICS IS IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US - NOT JUST TO THOSE SERVING IN AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS OR THOSE IN THE SURFACE FORCE. EFFECTIVELY EXECUTING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS INVOLVES OUR ENTIRE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TEAM. OVER THE COMING YEAR, I ENCOURAGE YOU TO READ, TO THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU READ AND THEN TO APPLY WHAT YOU'VE LEARNED TO THE TASK AT HAND AS WE PREPARE FOR AND EXECUTE BA 12.
5. ADMIRAL J. C. HARVEY JR., COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
SENDS.//

USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) Video Investigation – Final Actions

Team,

My review of the investigation is complete; I have taken final actions based on the report’s findings and forwarded my recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations for additional actions to be taken by the Secretary of the Navy.

To summarize what has taken place to date, I was informed of the existence of the videos on 1 January and immediately directed a JAGMAN investigation. On 4 January, I detached CAPT Honors for cause from command of ENTERPRISE based on the indisputable facts of his involvement in the videos. A complete and deliberate investigation was conducted into every aspect of the production and viewing of the videos to determine who was involved, to what degree they were involved, who in the chain-of-command actually saw the videos and, after viewing them, what action was or was not taken. The investigation was completed on 4 February and forwarded to me for review and action.

The investigation documented that at least 25 videos containing inappropriate scenes were produced and shown to the crew of ENTERPRISE from October 2005 to December 2007. ENTERPRISE’s Executive Officers, as well as other officers and senior enlisted sailors, were prominently depicted in these videos, acting crudely or in sexually suggestive ways. The investigation further confirmed that CAPT Honors did in fact receive complaints regarding the content of the videos shown during “XO Movie Night”, but deliberately chose not to change or alter his inappropriate behavior. In fact, over time, the productions spiraled downward with increasingly offensive content.
CAPT Honors’ conduct and the actions, or lack thereof, by his immediate superiors during that period, were not in keeping with our core values and the standards we expect of officers in the United States Navy.
The statement I made to the media today (below) includes the specific actions I took based on facts uncovered by the investigation. I encourage you to read my statement in its entirety to understand the reasons behind my decisions.
I’ve also included a link to the P4 message I transmitted to ENTERPRISE this afternoon to inform her crew of the results of the investigation and my actions.
Today, ENTERPRISE is forward deployed and combat ready, carrying out her assigned missions.
All the best, JCHjr

Click here to read my P4 message to ENTERPRISE

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ADMIRAL JOHN C. HARVEY, JR
STATEMENT ON ENTERPRISE VIDEO INVESTIGATION FINDINGS
3 MARCH 2011
GOOD AFTERNOON AND THANK YOU FOR COMING TODAY.

I AM ADMIRAL JOHN HARVEY, COMMANDER OF U.S. FLEET FORCES. I AM HERE TODAY TO PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE PRODUCTION AND BROADCAST OF INAPPROPRIATE VIDEOS ABOARD USS ENTERPRISE.

THAT INVESTIGATION IS NOW COMPLETE. I HAVE REVIEWED IT, TAKEN IMMEDIATE ACTIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS, AND FORWARDED TO THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

THE INVESTIGATION DOCUMENTED THAT AT LEAST 25 VIDEOS CONTAINING INAPPROPRIATE SCENES WERE PRODUCED AND SHOWN TO THE CREW OF ENTERPRISE FROM OCTOBER 2005 TO DECEMBER 2007.
ENTERPRISE’S EXECUTIVE OFFICERS, AS WELL AS OTHER OFFICERS AND SENIOR ENLISTED SAILORS, WERE PROMINENTLY DEPICTED IN THESE VIDEOS, ACTING CRUDELY OR IN SEXUALLY SUGGESTIVE WAYS.

THE INVESTIGATION CONCLUDED THAT THE PRODUCTION AND BROADCAST OF THESE VIDEOS REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM EXPECTED STANDARDS OF PERSONAL BEHAVIOR AND PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE NAVY.

IN ADDITION THE INVESTIGATION CONFIRMED THE PROFOUND LACK OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF CAPT HONORS, THEN SERVING AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ON USS ENTERPRISE.

THE BEHAVIOR EXHIBITED DURING THESE “XO MOVIE NIGHT” VIDEOS VIOLATES LONG-STANDING NORMS OF EXEMPLARY CONDUCT REQUIRED OF ALL NAVAL OFFICERS BY PUBLIC LAW AND U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS.

TO DOCUMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY AND ASSURE PROPER ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THESE VIOLATIONS OF EXPECTED STANDARDS OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR, I HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

• I HAVE FORWARDED TO THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS MY RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ISSUE SECRETARIAL LETTERS OF CENSURE TO THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS:

• CAPTAIN OWEN HONORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF ENTERPRISE FOR THE PERIOD JULY 2005 TO SEPTEMBER 2007;

• CAPTAIN JOHN DIXON, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF ENTERPRISE FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 2007 TO JUNE 2009;

• REAR ADMIRAL LAWRENCE RICE, COMMANDING OFFICER OF ENTERPRISE FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 2005 TO MAY 2007;

• REAR ADMIRAL RON HORTON, COMMANDING OFFICER OF ENTERPRISE FOR THE PERIOD MAY 2007 TO MAY 2010

• I HAVE ALSO REQUESTED THAT A COPY OF THE INVESTIGATION, ALONG WITH A COPY OF MY ENDORSEMENT, BE PLACED IN EACH OF THESE OFFICERS’ PERMANENT MILITARY RECORD.

• I HAVE ISSUED NON-PUNITIVE LETTERS OF CAUTION TO REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND SPICER AND VICE ADMIRAL DANIEL HOLLOWAY, THE STRIKE GROUP COMMANDERS EMBARKED IN ENTERPRISE DURING THE SHIP’S 2006 AND 2007 DEPLOYMENTS, AND I HAVE ALSO REQUESTED THAT A COPY OF THE INVESTIGATION, ALONG WITH A COPY OF MY ENDORSEMENT, BE PLACED IN EACH OFFICER’S PERMANENT MILITARY RECORD.

• I HAVE COUNSELED REAR ADMIRAL GREGORY NOSAL AND REAR ADMIRAL CLIFFORD SHARPE, THE CARRIER AIR WING COMMANDER AND DESTROYER SQUADRON COMMODORE EMBARKED IN ENTERPRISE DURING THE SHIP’S 2006 DEPLOYMENT

• I HAVE ISSUED NON-PUNITIVE LETTERS OF CAUTION TO 32 OFFICERS AND SAILORS WHO DEMONSTRATED DEFICIENCIES IN PERSONAL BEHAVIOR OR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT RELATED TO THE PRODUCTION AND BROADCAST OF THESE VIDEOS.

IT IS FAIR TO ASK HOW THIS SERIES OF EVENTS COULD HAPPEN OVER SUCH AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT THE KEY LEADERS ABOARD ENTERPRISE TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION.

THE INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THE PROBLEM STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF ENTERPRISE, THE OFFICERS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSISTING THE COMMANDING OFFICER IN MAINTAINING GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE AND ENSURING EXEMPLARY CONDUCT, WERE THEMSELVES THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM.

VULGAR LANGUAGE, INSENSITIVE AND SEXUALLY-TINGED ATTEMPTS AT HUMOR SUCH AS THAT DISPLAYED IN THE ENTERPRISE VIDEOS IS NOW AN EVERYDAY PART OF OUR POPULAR CULTURE AND ENDLESS EXAMPLES CAN BE FOUND ON CABLE TELEVISION AND IN THE MOVIES.

RECOGNIZING THIS FACT OF LIFE, SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE ACTIONS I HAVE TAKEN THUS FAR AND HAVE ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE VIDEOS AS HARMLESS ATTEMPTS TO RAISE CREW MORALE DURING A PERIOD OF DEMANDING OPERATIONS.

I CANNOT DISAGREE MORE STRONGLY!

NAVY LEADERS ARE NOT POPULAR ENTERTAINERS, BUT PROFESSIONALS VESTED WITH EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY AUTHORITY WHO MUST BE HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD AND MAINTAIN THEIR CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THEIR SUBORDINATES UNDER THE MOST DIFFICULT, EVEN POSSIBLY LIFE-THREATENING, CIRCUMSTANCES.

POOR JUDGMENT AND BEHAVIOR THAT UNDERMINES THAT CREDIBILITY THREATENS GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE AND, OVER TIME, JEOPARDIZES THE CREW’S FAITH IN ITS LEADERSHIP. THAT MEANS WE CANNOT SIMPLY IGNORE ACTIONS SUCH AS THE PRODUCTION OF THESE VIDEOS THAT CLEARLY CALL INTO QUESTION A NAVY LEADER’S JUDGMENT, CHARACTER, AND FITNESS TO COMMAND.

TO BE TRUE TO OUR NAVY’S CORE VALUES OF HONOR, COURAGE AND COMMITMENT, OUR LEADERS ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE WELL-BEING OF OUR PEOPLE, SHOW RESPECT TOWARD ALL, AND TREAT EACH INDIVIDUAL WITH DIGNITY.

THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THESE VIDEOS AND THOSE THAT DID NOT TAKE SUFFICIENT ACTION TO STOP THEM FROM BEING PRODUCED DID NOT MEET THAT HIGH STANDARD.

OUR SAILORS ARE TRULY REMARKABLE INDIVIDUALS, THE FINEST YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN OUR COUNTRY HAS TO OFFER, AND THEY DESERVE PRINCIPLED LEADERSHIP. THESE EVENTS ON ENTERPRISE WERE UNFORTUNATE AND AN ABERRATION.

FORTUNATELY, OUR NAVY IS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT LESSONS LEARNED (AND RE-LEARNED) FROM THIS INVESTIGATION ARE ALREADY BEING STUDIED, DISCUSSED AND INCORPORATED INTO APPROPRIATE LEADERSHIP TRAINING CURRICULA.
THANK YOU.