USS PONCE (LPD 15) CO / XO Relief

Team,

On Saturday, 23 April 2011, VADM Harry Harris, Commander, SIXTH Fleet, relieved the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of USS PONCE (LPD 15). I’ve provided a summary of events below to make sure you have the facts behind the decisions that were made and the timeline on which the Preliminary Investigation was conducted. I fully support VADM Harris’ decision – I believe he made exactly the right call.

Unfortunately, like PONCE, most of the Commanding Officers (COs) detached for cause on my watch were for personal misconduct. In every case, each Commanding Officer, whether through personal misconduct, negligence, or exceptionally poor judgment, lost the trust of their subordinates or their superiors and without that fundamental building block in place - trust - they no longer had the ability to command. Here's a summary of the ten Commanding Officer reliefs that occurred in 2010 and 2011 in U.S. Fleet Forces.

• USS THE SULLIVANS- Multiple operational incidents culminating with a buoy collision that damaged the port screw while deployed.
• USS JOHN L HALL - Collision with a pier while deployed
• USS TRUXTUN - Inappropriate relationship with a junior member of the wardroom.
• NCTS Bahrain - Inappropriate relationships with several members of the command.
• USS GUNSTON HALL - Sexual harassment, maltreatment of subordinates, assault, drunk and disorderly conduct. Command Master Chief (CMC) also relieved for failure to take appropriate action for inappropriate/unprofessional behavior.
• USS MEMPHIS - Cheating ring involving exams.
• NMCB 21 - Failure to address inappropriate/unprofessional behavior by subordinates. CMC also relieved for failure to take appropriate action for fraternization and unduly familiar relationships.
• USS ENTERPRISE - Exceptional lack of judgment while XO of ENTERPRISE.
• USS STOUT - Failure to take action to deter unprofessional behavior in overseas ports, hostile command climate. CMC also relieved for failure to correct a pervasive pattern of unprofessional behavior by the ship's crew.
• USS PONCE - Dereliction of duty, unprofessional conduct, favoritism, hostile command climate. Executive Officer (XO also relieved for being complicit by action and inaction in creating a hostile, unprofessional and unsafe environment onboard PONCE.

For those of you who are in the command pipeline or still contemplating a career that culminates in command, I think it is important that you understand the following significant lessons from these incidents:

(1) Loyalty to the Institution. The responsibility of a CO for his/her command is absolute and COs are provided with tremendous authority to execute their responsibilities (Navy Regulations). When a CO is negligent, demonstrates personal misconduct, or routinely exhibits poor judgment that places the command at risk, the XO and CMC are faced with a hard decision - loyalty to the individual or loyalty to the institution. Although the answer is easy - loyalty to the institution - the decisions that will be required to maintain good order and discipline at the command, which includes addressing CO issues, will be hard but must be made. Problems do not fix themselves and only grow worse with time.

(2) Command Leadership Team. Commanding Officers must have the forceful backup of their XO and CMC to succeed in command. Conversely, the XO and CMC cannot cede their shared responsibility for good order and discipline to the CO. You simply cannot be a strong "Yes Man" and a good XO or CMC at the same time. Correcting the improper orders or behavior of our seniors (forceful backup) is critical to mission success and good order and discipline. Forceful backup means just that - forceful backup. The XO and CMC must have the courage to address CO issues with the CO until they are resolved. There is often no clear line of demarcation on what must be addressed - it's the ultimate gut check call based on your beliefs and your core values. I personally believe the greatest act of loyalty to a CO by any subordinate is keeping him/her from making a serious mistake. On PONCE, VADM Harris also determined that the XO failed to provide the forceful backup to the CO necessary for her to succeed. Had he done his job and provided forceful backup despite the CO's overpowering nature, there was a chance that this whole matter could have been avoided. Contrast this situation with STOUT. There, with a popular and well-liked but very hands-off CO, the CMC was the weak link and kept command issues from the CO - issues that ultimately caused his downfall. In both cases, the Command Leadership Team failed the Navy and the CO was held accountable, along with the relevant other corner of the triad.

(3) Risk Taking. Effective operations in a rapidly changing battlespace are absolutely dependent on intelligent initiative which means intelligent risk-taking. With any risk-taking, there will inevitably be mistakes. There is a big difference between mistakes in judgment that are well-intentioned, recoverable, and result from inexperience and those actions resulting from willful negligence or fatal flaws, personal or professional. I think it is clear that all of the reliefs summarized above were a result of the latter and not the former.

Command at sea is still the best job in the Navy and the highlight of any naval career. Most of our COs succeed every day in tough circumstances and successfully complete their command tours. Although CO failures are rare, they are traumatic to our Navy and to our units, which is why they garner so much attention (as they should). We must learn from these failures and move on. But the fundamental fact remains, the vast majority of our COs succeed in command.

All the best, JCHjr

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Summary of USS PONCE Events:

The U.S. Fleet Forces Command Inspector General received an anonymous hotline complaint on Friday, 14 April 2011, alleging misconduct by the Commanding Officer of USS PONCE, CDR Etta Jones. PONCE was on station near the coast of Libya as part of the KEARSARGE Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) supporting Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. The complaint alleged administrative and operational misconduct that included creating a hostile command climate, preferential treatment, safety and navigation violations, and manipulating reports/withholding facts to preclude outside investigation.

ADM Locklear, Commander, Naval Forces Europe, and VADM Harris, Commander, SIXTH Fleet, were informed of the allegations on 15 April 2011. VADM Harris initiated a JAGMAN Preliminary Inquiry to determine the validity of the allegations, get a sense of the command climate and assess operational impacts. An investigation team embarked PONCE on 18 April 2011 and completed the Preliminary Inquiry on 22 April 2011.

Based on the findings of the Preliminary Investigation, VADM Harris held Admiral's mast on 23 April 2011 and found that CDR Jones failed to report and take proper corrective action for hazing and for poor judgment during a security drill where she endangered two Sailors with a loaded (condition 1) weapon. Upon conclusion of the Mast, VADM Harris relieved CDR Jones of her command due to loss of confidence stemming from the aforementioned Mast, unprofessional conduct, rendering her chain-of-command largely ineffective by marginalizing her senior leaders and displaying blatant favoritism to select junior officers, and for cultivating a hostile work environment permeated by verbal abuse, fear, and intimidation.

VADM Harris also relieved the Executive Officer, LCDR Kurt Boenisch, due to loss of confidence based on his failure to act as required to address the pervasive misbehavior of the Commanding Officer which perpetuated a hostile work environment, failure to thoroughly investigate allegations of misconduct and appropriately address substantiated hazing onboard PONCE, and demonstrated lack of good judgment and moral courage.

VADM Harris forwarded his endorsement of the Preliminary Investigation on 25 April 2011. The U.S. Fleet Forces Inspector General investigation into the hotline complaint remains open.

USS OAK HILL (LSD 51) INSURV

Team,
I would like to congratulate USS OAK HILL (LSD 51) on completing and passing her underway material inspection (UMI) conducted by the board of inspection and survey (INSURV) earlier this month. Anyone who has served on a ship in our Navy knows very well the tireless effort that goes into preparing for an INSURV inspection. I am very pleased with OAK HILL’s results; in fact, the scores she achieved were outstanding. The crew, the ISIC and the TYCOM put in a superb effort to prepare her for this inspection and the results of their hard work speak for themselves – 16 functional areas graded “green” and just two “yellow.” Her scores exceed those of any other CNSL surface ship that has undergone a material inspection in the past year. Furthermore, she scored twice as high as two other Atlantic Fleet LSDs that recently completed UMIs.
Now, I want to be clear that OAK HILL did not simply get lucky.  Her crew worked very hard and they were clearly very well-prepared for this inspection. But, as with any success story, there are a lot of lessons we learned that we must now apply going forward.
OAK HILL did not get here overnight; in fact, a year ago she was in very poor condition. We had to put an extraordinary amount of funding, oversight, remedial training, and repair resources into OAK HILL to restore her to a condition of compliance with our standards of safety, preservation, and material condition – standards which she, and all of our ships, are expected to maintain at all times.
Although the results of OAK HILL’s UMI suggest that even our most poorly maintained ships can be reinvigorated, this diversion of waterfront resources will not serve as the de facto model for every ship in the Fleet. RADM Thomas and I both agree that this is exactly the wrong model for generating current readiness and ensuring our ships serve the full extent of their expected service lives.
Improving the overall readiness of our Surface Force has taken a steady effort from all of us – ISICs, TYCOM, and, most importantly, the ships crew; we have a long way to go. OAK HILL’s performance shows us the importance of sufficiently funding maintenance and adequately manning our ships, but we cannot get the Fleet where we need it to be by “surging for INSURV” every few years. We need a steady and predictable flow of resources, well-trained Sailors in sufficient numbers and properly funded maintenance plans, for the Fleet which is precisely what I have been focused on, and will remain focused on, as Commander, US Fleet Forces.
I made a commitment to our Sailors to provide them with the tools, training and time they need to execute their missions (which includes maintaining the material health of their ship) and I absolutely intend to do all I can to deliver on that promise.
In return, I expect the CO and the leadership team to take ownership of their ships and hold their crews accountable to the high standards we must maintain every single day – not just during workups or material inspections. Leadership oversight (XO, CHENG, and BOSN, as particularly called out by the Senior Inspector) and honest feedback up and down the chain of command were major factors in OAK HILL’s performance. That assessment is not surprising to me. I’ve always known that our Sailors, when properly trained and well led, will always, rpt always, give you their best.
Well done, OAK HILL!
All the best, JCHjr

Bold Alligator 2012 Reading Program – Progress Report

Team,
Below is the chart I am using to keep track of my progress as I work through the Bold Alligator 2012 reading program I put together and sent out last month. I think I’ve gotten off to a good start and hope you’ve been able to do the same. I’m very interested in your thoughts as you finish any of these books, so please be sure to leave me your comments below.
I intend to update this chart as I complete each book, so if you want to keep track of how I’m doing, and keep pace with me, you can follow the “BA’12 Reading Program” link in the right margin under my “Commander’s Links.”
You can download a copy of "Eagles and Alligators" here.
All the best, JCHjr

Visit to Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF GTMO)

Team,
Recently, I spent a day with our Sailors who are inside the wire supporting Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF GTMO) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. JTF GTMO is the task force that provides the care and custody of detained enemy combatants.

Thanks to the Assistant Officer-in-Charge
of Camp VI for a very useful visit and
discussion

JTF GTMO has three supporting components: The Headquarters Element; Joint Medical Group; and the Joint Detention Group. Our Navy has Sailors deployed as Individual Augmentees (IAs) supporting each component with the majority conducting detainee ops in the Joint Detention Group.

The Joint Detention Group (JDG) is the guard force component of JTF GTMO comprised of Sailors and Soldiers responsible for detainee ops. The Sailors in the JDG are IAs from our Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion (NEGB) who provide “safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody” of the detainees they oversee. These Sailors come from a variety of Navy career fields, but all go through five weeks of training conducted by subject matter experts to learn the skills needed for guard duty and become familiar with the latest tactics used by detainees. Upon arriving for duty at the camp, they undergo an additional two weeks of on-the-job turnover with the Sailors they are replacing.

During my visit, I had the opportunity to observe and talk with our Sailors about their jobs and the many challenges they face and work through every day.  I was very pleased to see how they filter out the “noise” from working in such a controversial location and instead stay focused on executing their mission every day. And I can assure you, there is not a more difficult mission in our Navy right now.

Talking with our Sailors about some of the issues unique
 to an Individual Augmentee assigned to JTF GTMO

There is nothing that can fully prepare our Sailors for all of the unique experiences they encounter during their tour at GTMO. Every day they come face-to-face with individuals who hate them and everything they represent. Detainees employ a range of tactics in an attempt to disrupt the flow of daily operations, reduce morale in the camps, and physically and mentally manipulate the guards. Yet our Sailors exercise proper restraint and stick to the strict operating procedures of the camp - they are true professionals. I want to underscore the importance of our Sailors’ professional conduct because I believe it directly contributes to our credibility around the world. Many of these detainees are being held for planning and/or carrying out terrorist activities against our nation. Our Sailors at GTMO are well aware of this fact, yet they still carry out their duties every day with remarkable discipline.

Overall, I was extremely impressed by the Sailors I had the opportunity to meet and talk with. They clearly understand the importance of their mission and take their jobs very seriously. I appreciate the time they gave me and the very candid conversations we had…I’ve already started taking action on the issues we discussed.

Getting the gouge from our Sailors over a good meal

Bottom-line - These are great Sailors doing a damn difficult job extremely well. I couldn't be more proud of them. All the best, JCHjr

Our Global Navy

Team,
Whenever I think about our Navy and what we deliver for our nation, the same three words always come to mind – READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT. Recent events in Libya demonstrate the fundamental truth of those words.

With very little advance notice, our ships and aircraft were placed in position to deliver effects ashore in support of our national objectives, from Tomahawk strikes to knock down the Libyan air defense network to launching the quick reaction TRAP mission from KEARSARGE to rescue downed aviators.

At the very same time, half a world away, the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet is leading the effort delivering humanitarian aid and disaster relief to Japan in response to the devastating earthquake and tsunami as well as providing assistance in recovering from the nuclear accidents that occurred in the wake of the natural disasters. The same words apply in relief efforts for Japan – our naval forces were READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT.

The types of ships we’re using for those vastly different missions are very similar – Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine forces, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers capable of launching Tomahawks or helos with food and water, and MSC ships supplying the logistics support to keep our ships at sea indefinitely. Built into our ships is the flexibility and agility to respond to a wide variety of missions enabled by the fundamental fact that our Navy is truly expeditionary and routinely forward-deployed around the globe.

Think about what else is going on in addition to Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and Operation TOMODACHI – we have two Carrier Strike Groups in the NAVCENT AOR supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, our SSBN force is deployed to the Atlantic and Pacific conducting strategic nuclear deterrent patrols (as they have for over 50 years), USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7) is deployed in support of PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2011 to sustain our strategic relationships with a host of nations in the South and South West Pacific Ocean areas, USS STEPHEN W. GROVES (FFG 29) and USS ROBERT G. BRADLEY (FFG 49) are deployed in support of Africa Partnership Station and the USNS COMFORT will soon depart Norfolk in support of Operation CONTINUING PROMISE to conduct a wide array of humanitarian operations and partner capacity building exercises throughout Central and South America.

Our Navy – a global force, routinely forward-deployed and inherently expeditionary – executing the key tenets of our Maritime Strategy every day.

Our Navy – a READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT force – able to operate across the spectrum of conflict because of the professionalism, initiative and quality of our PEOPLE.

And now our challenge – sustaining this expeditionary capability to respond globally, rapidly and effectively to whatever mission comes our way. We must ensure our ships, submarines and aircraft are well-maintained, our magazines and parts lockers are full, and our Sailors are well-trained despite the nation’s ongoing fiscal crisis and the inevitable impact this crisis will have on our operations and maintenance funding over the next three years.

Just as our Sailors and our forces are up to the missions they’ve been given, so must we be up to the challenge to sustain our Navy into the future and ensure we remain READY, RESPONSIVE, and RELEVANT in this chaotic and violent world.
All the best, JCHjr