Revised Missions, Functions, and Tasks (MFT)

Team,

When I took command of Fleet Forces, one of my immediate objectives was to work with PACFLT to reestablish clear lines of authority and accountability up and down the chain-of-command. A clear and unambiguous chain of command is fundamental to unity of action and requires the strict adherence to time-tested, combat-proven, core command and control principles.

Over the last decade, our Navy pursued efficiency initiatives to reduce the cost of manning, training, equipping and maintaining naval forces that included the establishment of AIRFOR, SURFOR and SUBFOR and the Warfare Enterprises. Although intended as a behavioral model to promote Navy-wide collaboration and coordination within existing chains-of-command, the cumulative effect of these initiatives over time has been to move our Navy away from its core command and control principles, specifically, unity of command.

To correct the problems above and reestablish chains-of-command that conform to core command and control principles, CNO revised the Missions, Functions, and Tasks (MFT) of PACFLT and Fleet Forces.

Admiral Walsh and I released a joint P4 today to explain CNO’s changes to our MFTs and their immediate impact on the Fleet.
I want to discuss two of those changes here to ensure they are not misconstrued in any way.

“Fleet TYCOMS”
Our revised MFTs effectively eliminate the term “Fleet TYCOM” and realigns AIRFOR and SURFOR from Fleet Forces to PACFLT. The benefit of this change is twofold:
First, it removes the parallel chain-of-command that AIRFOR and SURFOR previously had by establishing ADM Walsh at PACFLT as the only reporting senior for both AIRFOR/AIRPAC and SURFOR/SURFPAC.
Second, since naval forces are assigned to individual Type Commanders, only the Type Commanders have the authority to man, train, and equip and maintain assigned forces. Accordingly, AIRPAC, SURFPAC, and SUBLANT will retain their titles as AIRFOR, SURFOR and SUBFOR and will still have the responsibility to develop and coordinate common policies and standards in their respective Fleets; however, implementation of the policy and standards will be done strictly through the individual Type Commanders (e.g. AIRPAC and AIRLANT).
Current AIRFOR, SURFOR and SUBFOR instructions will remain in effect until superseded.

Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE)
The Fleet Readiness Enterprise has been replaced with the Fleet Integration Executive Panel and will be co-chaired by Admiral Walsh and me.
The original intent of the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE) was to optimize the cost-effective delivery of operational forces ready for tasking across the Warfare Enterprises. Since its formation in 2006, the FRE has evolved into an effective integration forum to address cross-Fleet operational and maintenance issues and to articulate joint Fleet requirements to CNO. The revised MFTs recognize the current role of the FRE as an effective Fleet integration forum, and reduces the scope of effort from integration across five Warfare Enterprises to integration across the two Fleets.

I want to be very clear that this revision does not change the assignment of forces, manpower or funding for either PACFLT or Fleet Forces.
This revision provides us with a clear line of authority and accountability from individual units straight up to the Fleet Commanders, who are ultimately responsible for providing them with the training, tools and time needed to deploy with confidence in their ability to accomplish their assigned missions.
There is also no intent or desire to move us back to a “two-Fleet” Navy. These changes ensure PACFLT and Fleet Forces operate from a common baseline defined by Joint policy and Joint standards, but also acknowledges that the Naval environment is not the same in the Atlantic and Pacific so we should not pursue “cookie cutter” solutions to problems that may be unique to each Fleet.

You can read the P4 Admiral Walsh and I released today here.

All the best, JCHjr

The Fleet Readiness Enterprise

I recently released my Commander's Guidance followed by SERIALs on Anti-terrorism / Force Protection (ATFP) and Command and Control (C2). Since I released my guidance - specifically my C2 SERIAL - I have been asked how it affects the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE)/Warfare Enterprises.

To answer that question, I think it is important to start with a quick recap of the history and original purpose of the Navy Enterprise. The Navy Enterprise started as Sea Enterprise in 2001, a part of the Sea Power-21 construct, with the purpose of increasing collaboration throughout the Navy to ensure we achieved the most effective and efficient results from the resources we were given. Because of the successes of the Navy Enterprise efforts, the scope was expanded and the Fleet Readiness Enterprise/Warfare Enterprises and the Provider Enterprise were established. One consequence of this expansion was that the Navy Enterprise began to evolve away from a purely behavioral construct and blurred lines of authority and accountability.

For example, in the case of SUBFOR, we effectively eliminated the distinction between SUBFOR and SUBLANT roles by eliminating the SUBLANT title. This action was a clear example of confusing clear command and control between a Commander overseeing enterprise related activity under his enterprise title (SUBFOR) and a TYCOM exercising ADCON authorities. Titles are important because they can result in behavior that is more reflective of title than actual authorities. Similar types of issues exists across all the Warfare Enterprises.

When I took command of Fleet Forces, one of my immediate objectives was to work with PACFLT to reestablish clear lines of authority and accountability (chain-of-command), yet retain the many benefits of the positive collaborative environment created by Fleet Readiness Enterprise/Warfare Enterprises.

Admiral Walsh and I have made two primary changes with regard to the FRE/Warfare Enterprises:

First, we re-chartered the FRE so that it is co-chaired by both Admiral Walsh and me. We also re-focused the FRE on developing integrated solutions on joint USFF and CPF issues for our decision.

Second, we released a joint P4 on "Core Command and Control Principles." This P4 identified time-tested, combat proven, core C2 principles that we need to return to and directed action to solve the issues highlighted above. Most importantly, this P4 also reaffirmed our strong commitment to Enterprise collaboration.

So our intent has never been to eliminate Enterprise behavior or the FRE/Warfare Enterprises - our intent was to clearly differentiate between the FRE goal of collaborative behavior on Navy-wide issues and the enduring requirement for a clear and unambiguous chain-of-command within both US Fleet Forces and the US Pacific Fleet.  All the best, JCHjr.