Our Reality

Team,

When I took command of Fleet Forces in July 2009, one of my first actions was to conduct an All-Hands call with my staff to inform them that we were entering a period of great challenge and sustained uncertainty. I told them I believed we were headed for permanent whitewater; that is, an environment in which our overall defense budget would very likely decrease, while our costs to own and operate the Fleet would likely continue to increase.

When you consider the environment we’re in today – our decreasing defense budget, looming sequestration cuts and increasing demand for our forces around the world – I believe we have indeed entered that permanent whitewater. And we’re in it at a time when we have an unprecedented percentage of the Fleet routinely forward deployed in a variety of “hot spots” around the world. While we have no idea yet when this whitewater will end (I believe we’re just getting started), we can be sure the demand for our forward-deployed Navy will not slacken one bit.

Now, I’ve served through several of these fiscal “downturns” over the course of my 39 year career. I was commissioned in 1973 during a particularly turbulent time for our nation. The public discontent with the war in Vietnam was very high (and taking its toll on our Navy), our nation was sharply divided on just about every national issue, we were on the cusp of a recession that would affect our nation (and our Navy) for the rest of the decade and the defense budget had dropped by about 25% over the previous five years. In many ways, it was a perfect storm of fiscal and social chaos. We faced similar challenges in the immediate post-Cold War period of the 1990s when our defense budgets steadily declined for nearly a decade (the “peace” dividend) and our Navy took a “procurement holiday,” the impact of which we are still feeling today.

Each of these down cycles and turbulent periods posed their own unique set of challenges to our Navy, but they provide us with lessons that we can apply to our own situation today. I want to share with you some of the important lessons I learned during those times that I believe apply to everyone in the Fleet today, regardless of where you are in the chain-of-command or your community warfare specialty.

First, this is our reality and we must accept it. This whitewater and all the churn that comes with it is not going away anytime soon. The world is not going to settle down so we can take a “training time-out” and figure out how we’re going to deal with our new fiscal and operational environment. And we don’t have the option (nor do we want it!) of simply packing up and walking away when the times are tough. Now is the time to be thinking about how we’re going to adapt to an increasingly austere future in an increasingly volatile world. If we continue to operate under the “business as usual” mindset, we will fail. I can assure you that whatever our future looks like, it will not simply be business as usual.

Second, we must make the tough decisions that the times demand of us and own the consequences of those decisions. Fewer resources brings competing priorities. I wrote here over two years ago that in an environment with declining resources, there are things that we inevitably will not be able to do (ref: do less, but not less well). While our overall operational demand shows no sign of slowing down, fiscal discipline demands that we prioritize requirements and make the reuired decisions about how we will meet our missions. This area is not one in which we can simply stick our heads in the sand and hope for the best. Hope is never an acceptable strategy in our line of work. Hoping for a result means you’ve lost control of the situation or your ability to influence the outcome. We live with the consequences of our decisions, not our hopes.

Third, take ownership of your responsibilities. If you see a problem, be part of the solution. I talked earlier this year about BMC Pici and how he and his team took ownership of Corrosion Control on USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. BMC Pici had engaged the entire ship and created an environment in which every member of the crew was responsible for some aspect of corrosion control and prevention, just like every member of the crew is expected to have fundamental DC skills. And when given the opportunity, he took a chance and told me he needed paint floats because there weren’t any available (a problem RADM Dave Thomas and I promptly fixed). BMC Pici took ownership of his responsibilities and did what he felt he needed to do in order to ensure his team had the tools they needed to do their jobs – just like I want every Sailor in the Fleet to take ownership of their program, division, department, and command.

Finally, don’t lose sight of why we’re here. My job and commitment to our Sailors is to give them the tools, training and time they need to deploy confident in their ability to carry out their assigned missions. If you work at Fleet Forces, then your job should contribute in some way to this mission (i.e. providing Forces ready for tasking). We’ve reached a point where we all need to take a hard look at the many tasks we do each day and ask ourselves how it contributes to our mission. And we need to make the decisions (see previous paragraph) to stop spending resources on endless churn that has no clear benefit to our Sailors or our mission. We’re here to ensure our Sailors have what they need to get the job done. Period.

Many of the challenges we face every day are not exclusive to rank. Whether you’re a Flag Officer commanding a strike group or a Fire Controlman manning a weapons console in a DDG, your feedback on how we address our challenges is important. That’s why I’ve maintained this blog and fostered an open discussion up and down the chain-of-command for the three years I’ve been in command of Fleet Forces. At the end of the day, the onus is on us to take ownership of the Fleet and ensure we remain the Ready, Responsive, and Relevant force our nation needs. All the best, JCHjr

Old Lessons Re-learned

Team,
I recently had the opportunity to re-read one of my favorite leadership books – Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat. The book was written by James R. McDonough and chronicles his experience in Vietnam when he commanded an infantry platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

This book is powerfully written and retains its hold on me even through multiple re-readings. I’d like to share one passage in particular with you:

“War is the management of violence,” claimed the contemporary social scientists and military strategists as we hacked our way through the struggle in Vietnam. For us, violence was killing; there was no management involved. People were either dead, or they were not. I could not “manage” my platoon up a hill. I had to lead them up there. I had a mission to accomplish and I had men to keep alive, as many as I could.

I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their human dignity. I was making them kill, forcing them to commit the most uncivilized of acts, but at the same time I had to keep them civilized. That was my duty as their leader. They were good men, but they were facing death, and men facing death can forgive themselves many things. War gives the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must live with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to help them understand there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity. If the leader loses his own sense of propriety, or shrinks from his duty, anything will be allowed. And anything can happen.

McDonough describes the extreme leadership experience – tactical command of troops in daily combat. But two lessons he drew from that experience apply broadly and are well worth remembering.

1. “I could not ‘manage’ my platoon up a hill. I had to lead them up there.”

We must never forget our ultimate responsibility is for leading Sailors, not managing them. You manage things; you lead people. Whether you’re a division officer on your first ship or a Flag officer on your last tour, your duty is to lead Sailors to accomplish your assigned missions. And the leadership of our Sailors is an all-encompassing experience that requires you, if you want to do it well, to be “all-in.” Your commitment must be commensurate with your responsibility. Making that commitment, living that commitment, is the true reward of leadership – it is the inner joy of our profession, our reason for being.

2. “A leader has to help them understand there are lines they must not cross…; if the leader loses his own sense of propriety or shrinks from his duty, anything will be allowed. And anything can happen.”

Some wonder if our standard for our leaders is too high, that we expect too much. How can we possibly expect less?

McDonough recognized very early that his standard became his platoon’s standard and if he either would not or could not meet the standard, it would spell disaster for his platoon.

The performance and behavior standards we set for our leaders are the standards we must maintain in our Navy. They are the standards that maintain the discipline of a fighting force under great stress. They are our standards and we must embrace them, live them and hold ourselves accountable to them. Maintaining leadership standards means we are maintaining unit standards and maintaining unit standards means we are disciplined, focused and ready for whatever comes our way.

University of Notre Dame NROTC Remarks

Team,
I recently had the great privilege of visiting with Naval ROTC students from around the country as keynote speaker for the 2012 Naval Leadership Weekend hosted by the University of Notre Dame NROTC Unit (my remarks here). Notre Dame shares a great history with our Navy, having been selected as a training location for our officer candidates early in World War II when the university faced severe financial difficulties after losing much of its enrollment due to the draft.

The Naval leadership event was held in the Press Box at the historic Notre Dame Stadium. For the 17th consecutive year, NROTC students from across our nation came together to discuss issues critical to their roles as Navy and Marine Corps leaders. I very much enjoyed the opportunity to speak with these young men and women about their fundamental responsibility to provide leadership to the Sailors and Marines who will soon be in their charge. I introduced the midshipmen to the leadership philosophy of Vice Admiral James Stockdale (previously discussed here), who served as an extraordinary model of moral leadership for my generation of Naval Officers.

Thanks again to CAPT Earl Carter and the Midshipmen of the Notre Dame NROTC unit for hosting me and a very special thank you to Mr. Dan Brazo for the exceptional tour of the Notre Dame stadium – “Play like a champion today!”
All the best, JCHjr

“Trial by Fire”

Team,
Attached (here) is an essay written by VADM Jim Stockdale USN (ret) from his book “Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot” in which he shares the five qualities he believes are essential in leaders during turbulent and difficult times. Now, I understand there are a lot of leadership books out there, but VADM Stockdale’s views are particularly compelling because they were shaped by the seven years of “death and hopelessness” he endured as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. His story is one of great struggle and determination to lead and guide his fellow prisoners (he was the senior officer) under the most challenging conditions imaginable and stand by his convictions (he would rather die than submit) during the most perilous of times (read his bio here).
I want to share this essay with you because I believe (as I’ve said here many times) that the times are indeed changing and VADM Stockdale’s message concerning the essentials of leadership is just as relevant and important today as when he wrote it for us in 1985.
All the best, JCHjr

Admiral Donald - Remarks to the 2011 Naval Submarine League Symposium

Team,
Admiral Donald (Director, Naval Reactors) recently delivered a very good speech at the 2011 Naval Submarine League Symposium that I think you'll benefit from reading. In his remarks, ADM Donald examines the lessons learned from three tragic and unique events to remind us of the importance of keeping the fundamentals of our profession firmly in place in everything we do. Although his remarks are to the Submarine community, the six principles he identifies to help us safeguard our technology from catastrophic events are applicable to every community as well as many of the complex issues we are addressing throughout our Navy today.
Download a copy of his remarks and give it a good read. All the best, JCHjr

Memo from John Paul Jones

Team,
I recently received a letter from RADM Rob Wray, President, Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) that he has been handing out to his staff as part of an ethics training package. The letter, written as if from John Paul Jones, is a great example of what he might say to our officers today on the meaning of being an officer and serving in command.
RADM Wray did a superb job putting this letter together; I encourage you to take a few minutes to read it, think about it, and pass it on to your colleagues.
You can download a copy here.
All the best, JCHjr

USS PONCE (LPD 15) CO / XO Relief

Team,

On Saturday, 23 April 2011, VADM Harry Harris, Commander, SIXTH Fleet, relieved the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of USS PONCE (LPD 15). I’ve provided a summary of events below to make sure you have the facts behind the decisions that were made and the timeline on which the Preliminary Investigation was conducted. I fully support VADM Harris’ decision – I believe he made exactly the right call.

Unfortunately, like PONCE, most of the Commanding Officers (COs) detached for cause on my watch were for personal misconduct. In every case, each Commanding Officer, whether through personal misconduct, negligence, or exceptionally poor judgment, lost the trust of their subordinates or their superiors and without that fundamental building block in place - trust - they no longer had the ability to command. Here's a summary of the ten Commanding Officer reliefs that occurred in 2010 and 2011 in U.S. Fleet Forces.

• USS THE SULLIVANS- Multiple operational incidents culminating with a buoy collision that damaged the port screw while deployed.
• USS JOHN L HALL - Collision with a pier while deployed
• USS TRUXTUN - Inappropriate relationship with a junior member of the wardroom.
• NCTS Bahrain - Inappropriate relationships with several members of the command.
• USS GUNSTON HALL - Sexual harassment, maltreatment of subordinates, assault, drunk and disorderly conduct. Command Master Chief (CMC) also relieved for failure to take appropriate action for inappropriate/unprofessional behavior.
• USS MEMPHIS - Cheating ring involving exams.
• NMCB 21 - Failure to address inappropriate/unprofessional behavior by subordinates. CMC also relieved for failure to take appropriate action for fraternization and unduly familiar relationships.
• USS ENTERPRISE - Exceptional lack of judgment while XO of ENTERPRISE.
• USS STOUT - Failure to take action to deter unprofessional behavior in overseas ports, hostile command climate. CMC also relieved for failure to correct a pervasive pattern of unprofessional behavior by the ship's crew.
• USS PONCE - Dereliction of duty, unprofessional conduct, favoritism, hostile command climate. Executive Officer (XO also relieved for being complicit by action and inaction in creating a hostile, unprofessional and unsafe environment onboard PONCE.

For those of you who are in the command pipeline or still contemplating a career that culminates in command, I think it is important that you understand the following significant lessons from these incidents:

(1) Loyalty to the Institution. The responsibility of a CO for his/her command is absolute and COs are provided with tremendous authority to execute their responsibilities (Navy Regulations). When a CO is negligent, demonstrates personal misconduct, or routinely exhibits poor judgment that places the command at risk, the XO and CMC are faced with a hard decision - loyalty to the individual or loyalty to the institution. Although the answer is easy - loyalty to the institution - the decisions that will be required to maintain good order and discipline at the command, which includes addressing CO issues, will be hard but must be made. Problems do not fix themselves and only grow worse with time.

(2) Command Leadership Team. Commanding Officers must have the forceful backup of their XO and CMC to succeed in command. Conversely, the XO and CMC cannot cede their shared responsibility for good order and discipline to the CO. You simply cannot be a strong "Yes Man" and a good XO or CMC at the same time. Correcting the improper orders or behavior of our seniors (forceful backup) is critical to mission success and good order and discipline. Forceful backup means just that - forceful backup. The XO and CMC must have the courage to address CO issues with the CO until they are resolved. There is often no clear line of demarcation on what must be addressed - it's the ultimate gut check call based on your beliefs and your core values. I personally believe the greatest act of loyalty to a CO by any subordinate is keeping him/her from making a serious mistake. On PONCE, VADM Harris also determined that the XO failed to provide the forceful backup to the CO necessary for her to succeed. Had he done his job and provided forceful backup despite the CO's overpowering nature, there was a chance that this whole matter could have been avoided. Contrast this situation with STOUT. There, with a popular and well-liked but very hands-off CO, the CMC was the weak link and kept command issues from the CO - issues that ultimately caused his downfall. In both cases, the Command Leadership Team failed the Navy and the CO was held accountable, along with the relevant other corner of the triad.

(3) Risk Taking. Effective operations in a rapidly changing battlespace are absolutely dependent on intelligent initiative which means intelligent risk-taking. With any risk-taking, there will inevitably be mistakes. There is a big difference between mistakes in judgment that are well-intentioned, recoverable, and result from inexperience and those actions resulting from willful negligence or fatal flaws, personal or professional. I think it is clear that all of the reliefs summarized above were a result of the latter and not the former.

Command at sea is still the best job in the Navy and the highlight of any naval career. Most of our COs succeed every day in tough circumstances and successfully complete their command tours. Although CO failures are rare, they are traumatic to our Navy and to our units, which is why they garner so much attention (as they should). We must learn from these failures and move on. But the fundamental fact remains, the vast majority of our COs succeed in command.

All the best, JCHjr

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Summary of USS PONCE Events:

The U.S. Fleet Forces Command Inspector General received an anonymous hotline complaint on Friday, 14 April 2011, alleging misconduct by the Commanding Officer of USS PONCE, CDR Etta Jones. PONCE was on station near the coast of Libya as part of the KEARSARGE Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) supporting Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. The complaint alleged administrative and operational misconduct that included creating a hostile command climate, preferential treatment, safety and navigation violations, and manipulating reports/withholding facts to preclude outside investigation.

ADM Locklear, Commander, Naval Forces Europe, and VADM Harris, Commander, SIXTH Fleet, were informed of the allegations on 15 April 2011. VADM Harris initiated a JAGMAN Preliminary Inquiry to determine the validity of the allegations, get a sense of the command climate and assess operational impacts. An investigation team embarked PONCE on 18 April 2011 and completed the Preliminary Inquiry on 22 April 2011.

Based on the findings of the Preliminary Investigation, VADM Harris held Admiral's mast on 23 April 2011 and found that CDR Jones failed to report and take proper corrective action for hazing and for poor judgment during a security drill where she endangered two Sailors with a loaded (condition 1) weapon. Upon conclusion of the Mast, VADM Harris relieved CDR Jones of her command due to loss of confidence stemming from the aforementioned Mast, unprofessional conduct, rendering her chain-of-command largely ineffective by marginalizing her senior leaders and displaying blatant favoritism to select junior officers, and for cultivating a hostile work environment permeated by verbal abuse, fear, and intimidation.

VADM Harris also relieved the Executive Officer, LCDR Kurt Boenisch, due to loss of confidence based on his failure to act as required to address the pervasive misbehavior of the Commanding Officer which perpetuated a hostile work environment, failure to thoroughly investigate allegations of misconduct and appropriately address substantiated hazing onboard PONCE, and demonstrated lack of good judgment and moral courage.

VADM Harris forwarded his endorsement of the Preliminary Investigation on 25 April 2011. The U.S. Fleet Forces Inspector General investigation into the hotline complaint remains open.

USS JASON DUNHAM and USS GRAVELY

Team,

This month our Navy is commissioning our two newest Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers the USS JASON DUNHAM (DDG-109) and USS GRAVELY (DDG-107). I want to talk about these two ships in particular because I believe they are more than just warships – they represent two great Americans who lived in very different times, with very different backgrounds, but whom have become symbols of courage and sacrifice for our nation.

USS JASON DUNHAM is named for 22 year old Marine Corporal Jason Dunham. On 14 April 2004 Corporal Dunham and his team were checking vehicles for weapons when an Iraqi insurgent leapt from his car and attacked him. Two of his fellow Marines were on their way to help when the insurgent released a grenade. In an instant, Corporal Dunham dropped to the ground, covered the explosive with his Kevlar helmet and absorbed the brunt of the blast with his body. All three Marines were seriously wounded from the explosion and Corporal Dunham would pass away eight days later in Bethesda.
Corporal Dunham made the conscious decision that day to fall on that grenade to absorb the blast and protect his fellow Marines. Make no mistake about it; his actions were decisive, deliberate, and judged worthy of our nation’s highest military decoration – the Medal of Honor. And we now honor his name and memory in our Navy’s history as DDG-109, the USS JASON DUNHAM.
USS JASON DUNHAM (DDG-109) was commissioned on 13 November 2010.
“Semper Fidelis, Semper Fortis”
The second ship we are commissioning this month is the USS GRAVELY (DDG-107). The ship’s namesake, VADM Samuel Lee Gravely, Jr., first enlisted in the Naval Reserves in 1942 as a Fireman Apprentice and in 1944 became the first African American commissioned as an officer from the Navy Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC). Although that accomplishment in and of itself was a fundamental change to our Navy at the time, he was only getting started. VADM Gravely would go on to become the first African American to command a Navy warship (including during combat operations), the first to command a major warship, the first to make the rank of Admiral, the first to make the rank of Vice Admiral and the first to command a Fleet (3rd Fleet).
What I find to be truly remarkable is that there was no script for VADM Gravely to follow…no path laid out for him. At a time in our nation when many of the doors of opportunity were closed to African Americans, VADM Gravely refused to be held back by the color of his skin. Through hard work, determination and an unwavering commitment to excellence, VADM Gravely permanently broke the barriers for African Americans and forever changed our Navy. And all along the way, throughout his 38 years of service to our nation, he would inspire and mentor many young Sailors that would become some of the finest leaders in our Navy.
USS GRAVELY (DDG-107) will be commissioned on 20 November 2010.
“First to Conquer”
All the best, JCHjr

Practices of Successful Commands – Part Two

Team,

In February I released a P4 to Fleet leadership on the “Practices of Successful Commands.” You can read it here. In my P4 I highlighted the fundamental programs that I believe are essential to maintaining the health of the force and the readiness of the Fleet. I also suggested that successful leadership teams are always giving a good, proactive “spin” to these programs to keep them on track.

In the time that has passed since I released that message, it has become apparent to me that there are two programs that need extra attention. The first is the Career Development Board and the second is our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program. I released a follow-up P4 last month that emphasizes the need to give these two programs a good “spin”. Below is a brief summary followed by the P4 in its entirety.

Career Development Boards. High retention and quality recruiting means our Sailors will face intense competition for reenlistment. Sailors need to be thinking hard about reenlistment as much as 13-18 months before PRD or EAOS to maximize their number of looks. Command leadership teams need to make sure they’re out there connecting with their Sailors and proactively educating them on the PTS requirements.

Sexual Assault Prevention. Sexual Assault is one of the most under-reported crimes in our Navy. Statistics show that nearly a quarter of all female Sailors have been sexually assaulted since joining the Navy. This is alarming not just because of the statistics, but because we all know it is wrong and yet it still occurs at this rate. We must educate our Sailors about the warning signs that often serve as a precursor to an incident and should one occur, the proper procedures for reporting it (or helping a shipmate in a very difficult situation). Further, we must not underestimate the importance of unit cohesion, Sailors supporting and looking out after their shipmates with the chain-of-command supporting their Sailors, as the most effective deterrent to this crime.

I encourage you to read the message below (or on the website here) in full to increase your awareness of these programs and to see what I have directed my leadership teams to do. Effective, timely and honest communication up and down the chain-of-command is absolutely essential to making progress in these critical areas.
All the best, JCHjr



P 252132Z JUN 10 ZYB PSN 723839I32
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UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICERS, OFFICERS IN CHARGE, AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEFS FROM ADM HARVEY SECINFO/-/-// MSGID/GENADMIN/COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//

SUBJ/PRACTICES OF SUCCESSFUL COMMANDS - PART TWO//
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1. IN THE FOUR MONTHS THAT HAVE ELAPSED SINCE SENDING YOU REF A, IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT TWO OF THE FOUNDATIONAL PROGRAMS I IDENTIFIED NEED A GOOD PROACTIVE SPIN FROM YOU SOONEST. THE FIRST IS THE CAREER DEVELOPMENT BOARD PROGRAM AND THE SECOND IS OUR SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAMS.
2. CAREER DEVELOPMENT BOARDS. YOU HAVE DONE A SUPERB JOB RETAINING OUR BEST SAILORS - RETENTION RATES ARE AT UNPRECEDENTED HIGHS. OUR RECRUITERS HAVE ALSO DONE A GREAT JOB BRINGING IN HIGH-QUALITY RECRUITS WITH A STRONG DESIRE TO SERVE. HIGH RETENTION AND QUALITY RECRUITING MEANS OUR SAILORS WILL FACE INTENSE COMPETITION FOR REENLISTMENT QUOTAS IN THE FUTURE. TO BEST PREPARE THEM (AND YOU) FOR THIS ENVIRONMENT, YOU SHOULD:
2.A. ENSURE YOUR COMMAND CAREER COUNSELOR GETS THE WORD OUT ASAP ON PERFORM-TO-SERVE (PTS) REQUIREMENTS, INCORPORATES PTS MILESTONES IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT BOARD DISCUSSIONS, AND TRACKS PTS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE COMMAND. PTS GIVES US THE ABILITY TO RETAIN OUR BEST SAILORS BY SCREENING ZONE A, B, AND C SAILORS FOR REENLISTMENT. HOWEVER, IF NOT EXECUTED PROPERLY, PTS CAN DISADVANTAGE YOUR BEST SAILORS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE LATE (OR EVEN WORSE, FORGOT) TO SUBMIT A PTS REQUEST AND ONLY PROVIDED THEMSELVES WITH ONE LOOK TO SECURE A PTS QUOTA. BECAUSE OF PTS, YOUR SAILORS NEED TO MAKE A REENLISTMENT DECISION AS EARLY AS 13, RPT 13, MONTHS BEFORE PRD OR EAOS TO ENSURE THEY MAXIMIZE THE NUMBER OF LOOKS TO SECURE A PTS QUOTA.
2.B. HOLD NON-PERFORMING SAILORS ACCOUNTABLE AND WORK TO SEPARATE SAILORS WHO DEMONSTRATE UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. THESE ACTIONS WILL DIRECTLY IMPACT THE PTS PROCESS AND POSITIVELY AFFECT THE ABILITY OF PROVEN PERFORMERS TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.
3. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAMS. SEXUAL ASSAULT REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST UNDER-REPORTED CRIMES IN OUR NAVY. RECENT SURVEYS INDICATE THAT ALMOST A QUARTER OF OUR FEMALE SAILORS HAVE EXPERIENCED SOME FORM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT SINCE JOINING OUR NAVY. THE STATISTICS ARE ALARMING NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE NUMBERS, BUT BECAUSE WE ALL KNOW IT IS WRONG AND YET IT IS STILL HAPPENING WITHIN OUR RANKS. THIS PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY BY REQUIRING MORE TRAINING OR BY RAMPING UP THE RHETORIC OR ITS VOLUME - OUR DAILY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OUR PROGRAMS MUST ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE CONDITIONS WHICH PREVENT SEXUAL ASSAULT FROM OCCURRING:
3.A. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIT COHESION (WE LOOK OUT AFTER OUR OWN!) TO OUR EFFORTS CANNOT BE OVERSTATED. THE TRUE INCLUSION - BY WORD AND DEED - OF ALL SAILORS ASSIGNED TO YOUR UNIT, IN THE DEEPEST SENSE OF THE WORD INCLUSION, IS THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH OUR PROGRAMS ARE BASED. YOU MUST BRING THE STRENGTH OF THE UNIT TO BEAR AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DETERRENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS THAT LEAD INEXORABLY TO INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL HARRASSMENT AND SEXUAL ASSAULT.
3.B. AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT INCIDENTS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY ALCOHOL ABUSE ULTIMATELY FUELING AN ALREADY BAD SITUATION. GETTING IN FRONT OF PROBLEMS HAS TO BE AN UNDERSTOOD RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERYONE IN YOUR COMMAND (I SAW SOMETHING SO I DID SOMETHING).
3.C. YOUR SAILORS MUST HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE TO MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS (OR HELP A SHIPMATE MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS) SHOULD A SEXUAL ASSAULT OCCUR. TO HELP YOU IN THIS AREA, I HAVE DIRECTED MY STAFF TO CONDUCT SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE WORKSHOPS THROUGHOUT THE FLEET. ENSURE YOUR COMMAND PARTICIPATES IN ONE OF MY WORKSHOPS.
4. AS LEADERS, THE ENDURING IMPACT WE MAKE ON OUR NAVY IS ULTIMATELY THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE WE TRAIN, MENTOR, AND RETAIN TO REPLACE US. CENTRAL TO GOOD LEADERSHIP IS MAINTAINING A STRONG AND VIBRANT TWO-WAY CONVERSATION WITH OUR SAILORS. IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR CAREER DEVELOPMENT CONVERSATION IS GOING WELL AND WE JUST NEED TO TAILOR IT FOR THE NEW ENVIRONMENT WE HAVE ENTERED - A VERY COMPETITIVE REENLISTMENT ENVIRONMENT. IT IS ALSO CLEAR WE HAVE TO GET PAST THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE SUBJECT AND EXPAND OUR DAILY CONVERSATION TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION, SO GET YOUR LEADERSHIP TEAM (INCLUDING YOUR COMMAND CAREER COUNSELOR) OUT ON THE DECK PLATES TO LISTEN, LEARN, AND LEAD.
5. ADM J. C. HARVEY, JR. SENDS.//
BT

Preparing for Your Future

Team,

I want to highlight an excellent thought-piece that I recently read.
In the article “Preparing for Your Future and That of the U.S. Army”, LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army retired) provides five actions a Soldier should take to prepare for an uncertain future.

1. Keep learning
2. Retain your best subordinates
3. Create a positive climate
4. Value adaptability
5. Attend to your personal life

LTG Dubik does an excellent job of distilling his 37 years of experience as an Army Officer into straightforward, actionable advice that I believe is relevant to our Navy Officers and Chief Petty Officers.

I encourage each of you to follow the link below to read the full article and think about how it applies to your particular situation, and what you might add to his list.

All the best, JCHjr

Click here to access the article.

Civilian Policy Recommendations

Last month, the President and Congress directed the Department of Defense to terminate the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). "The Secretary of Defense shall take all actions which may be necessary to provide, beginning no later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, for the orderly termination of the National Security Personnel System and conversion of all employees and positions from such System, by not later than January 1, 2012, to the statutory pay system [applicable before the conversion to NSPS]." No employee shall suffer any loss of or decrease in pay during and after the pay system transition.

I believe this decision provides us with an opportunity to evaluate our current civilian policies beyond those specific to NSPS to ensure they enable mission accomplishment, reward initiative, and provide opportunities for career advancement.

In order to back out of NSPS and create a smooth transition to a new system, we need your advice and recommendations. What policies are working and should be preserved? What policies should Navy and DoD change? What other ideas do you have that may result in attracting and retaining our civilian talent?  All the best, JCHjr

Sexual Assault Prevention

This month, Secretary of the Navy Mabus hosted a Navy Sexual Assault Prevention Summit.  At the summit, he noted the pervasive effects of sexual assault, stating "the effect on a survivor is devastating, but it's not just an individual travesty. Sexual assaults affect the survivor's family and friends. It's corrosive to morale and to our operational and combat readiness."  SECNAV has rightfully focused us on a core Navy issue, at the very heart of who we are and what we represent.

One of my fundamental beliefs is that we should honor and respect those around us and treat others as we would want to be treated. A violation of this respect is a violation of the individual dignity we possess as human beings.  We all know sexual assault is wrong - and a clear violation of individual dignity - yet it still is happening within our ranks.  And when it happens, we find that victims often say they feel re-victimized as we pursue justice.

This is not an issue that will be solved simply by shouting louder or pounding the table harder because we already know it is wrong.  So why are we not making sufficient progress in eliminating sexual assault in the Fleet, in our Navy?  What I would like you to do - what I need you to do - is to take an honest look at this issue:

What do you think is the most effective way of ending sexual assault in our Navy?  How do we keep from victimizing the victims when we pursue justice against those committing these crimes?  What will you, as a Shipmate and a leader in your workspace, your ship, or your squadron, do to help eliminate sexual assault?

Topics For Discussion

First, thank you for your encouragement and your patience as I continue to learn the best way to run this Blog so that we can have an honest and robust dialogue.

I would now like to hear from you on some topics I choose and on ones that you would like to discuss on this Blog.  I’ve got the topics already mentioned by Heretic, AW1 Tim, Benjamin Walthrop and others, but I know that there are many more out there.