I recently released my Commander's Guidance followed by SERIALs on Anti-terrorism / Force Protection (ATFP) and Command and Control (C2). Since I released my guidance - specifically my C2 SERIAL - I have been asked how it affects the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE)/Warfare Enterprises.
To answer that question, I think it is important to start with a quick recap of the history and original purpose of the Navy Enterprise. The Navy Enterprise started as Sea Enterprise in 2001, a part of the Sea Power-21 construct, with the purpose of increasing collaboration throughout the Navy to ensure we achieved the most effective and efficient results from the resources we were given. Because of the successes of the Navy Enterprise efforts, the scope was expanded and the Fleet Readiness Enterprise/Warfare Enterprises and the Provider Enterprise were established. One consequence of this expansion was that the Navy Enterprise began to evolve away from a purely behavioral construct and blurred lines of authority and accountability.
For example, in the case of SUBFOR, we effectively eliminated the distinction between SUBFOR and SUBLANT roles by eliminating the SUBLANT title. This action was a clear example of confusing clear command and control between a Commander overseeing enterprise related activity under his enterprise title (SUBFOR) and a TYCOM exercising ADCON authorities. Titles are important because they can result in behavior that is more reflective of title than actual authorities. Similar types of issues exists across all the Warfare Enterprises.
When I took command of Fleet Forces, one of my immediate objectives was to work with PACFLT to reestablish clear lines of authority and accountability (chain-of-command), yet retain the many benefits of the positive collaborative environment created by Fleet Readiness Enterprise/Warfare Enterprises.
Admiral Walsh and I have made two primary changes with regard to the FRE/Warfare Enterprises:
First, we re-chartered the FRE so that it is co-chaired by both Admiral Walsh and me. We also re-focused the FRE on developing integrated solutions on joint USFF and CPF issues for our decision.
Second, we released a joint P4 on "Core Command and Control Principles." This P4 identified time-tested, combat proven, core C2 principles that we need to return to and directed action to solve the issues highlighted above. Most importantly, this P4 also reaffirmed our strong commitment to Enterprise collaboration.
So our intent has never been to eliminate Enterprise behavior or the FRE/Warfare Enterprises - our intent was to clearly differentiate between the FRE goal of collaborative behavior on Navy-wide issues and the enduring requirement for a clear and unambiguous chain-of-command within both US Fleet Forces and the US Pacific Fleet. All the best, JCHjr.
03 March 2010
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2 comments:
Sea Power 21 and the FRE were intended as behavior models facilitating information flow to USFF from across the entire fleet to enhance the decision-making process. To advise CNO properly, USFF needs to be well-informed about the condition of operating forces all around the world and these cross-connected, matrixed organizational structures facilitated information flow to/from the experts in all the fleets. The requirement to request/receive information up, across and down a strict, stove-piped, chain-of-command structure greatly impedes information flow across the matrix and cripples this behavior model. Now it's likely that USFF will be less-informed at decision time.
I totally agree. I fail to see how life according to the C2 serial will encourage success of the FRE.
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