Changing Our Culture

Team,

After a year on station it is clear to me that, as I stated in my Guidance and Serials, one of the unintended consequences of focusing on cost reduction through the many “enterprise” efficiency initiatives we have undertaken over the last decade has been the placement of system cost above system performance in importance.

As a result, our priorities have become low cost, then schedule and lastly performance. This priority inversion has resulted in a culture where we are too willing to accept the delivery of substandard products (e.g. accepting starred cards as the norm and not the exception.)

My goal is to turn our priorities around by putting system performance back at the forefront. I’m not interested in engaging in a finger-pointing exercise – we are all part of the cultural problem that we have today. This will also not be an exercise where the Fleet recommends reinventing past organizations (e.g. PMS 400 for Aegis). Simply put, our effort is about doing what we can do today, within the authorities we have today, to ensure products delivered to the Fleet today perform to design specification.

It is about holding everyone accountable to established policy requirements and standards (see attached OPNAV Instruction). And finally, it is about taking many small steps to reach our goal because there is no “big-bang” solution – again, this is a cultural problem; so it is about setting standards, disciplined execution to those standards, and a willingness to “stay on it” over the long haul.

I need your help in fixing this cultural problem that we’ve allowed ourselves to develop. We simply can no longer allow products that do not perform to specification – ships, aircraft, submarines, systems or equipment – to enter our Fleet on our watch. All the best, JCHjr

Fleet Operations - Serial 007

Team,

I am transmitting my final Serial - Fleet Operations - after a year in command. This Serial is built upon our work together over the past year and puts our focus squarely on the DISCIPLINED EXECUTION OF FLEET OPERATIONS.

To remind, my Guidance reflects what I learned from you during my first six months in command. The Serials direct the actions we must take to adjust Fleet operations and behaviors in order to deliver forces ready for tasking. Our forces are ready for tasking if, and only if, they are able to effectively employ their combat systems to the limit of their designed capability and sustain that effective employment for the entire duration of the deployment.

Disciplined execution will be required to provide ready forces today and sustain today's Fleet into the future. We've got the 80% solution for many of the issues before us -- so now it's time to move out, ensure vigorous follow-up, and adjust course as necessary on the final approach to station.

I have great confidence in you and in the Sailors and Navy civilians we are honored and privileged to lead. I look forward to continue to work alongside you to overcome the challenges ahead and keep our Fleet the global, responsive and relevant force it is today. One Team - One Fight!

All the best, JCHjr

Transitioning New Capabilities to the Fleet - Serial 006

Team,
The ability of a ship, submarine, aircraft, weapon system, information system or piece of equipment to perform to design specification is a fundamental element of the Fleet's operational readiness. We significantly disadvantage our Sailors and risk mission success when we accept the delivery of substandard performance or unsustainable programs (i.e., programs delivered with unresolved performance, manning, training and logistics support issues).

Accordingly, the attached Transitioning New Capabilities to the Fleet Serial (006) focuses on our responsibility to ensure new and modernized capabilities delivered to the Fleet can IMMEDIATELY contribute to the Navy's mission. It is also our responsibility to ensure the manpower, training and support systems required by our Sailors to sustain operational readiness through expected service life are IN PLACE AND PROPERLY FUNCTIONING when Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is declared.

Successful system and platform delivery to the Fleet will require our single-minded focus on the product and not the long, complex acquisition process. Success will also require a standardized Fleet introduction process that ensures we ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED POLICY, rigorously assess a new capability BEFORE we accept it, and provide a formal Fleet recommendation to CNO whether he should accept any request to deliver or place in active status a ship, submarine, aircraft, weapon system, or piece of equipment.

All the best, JCHjr

Personnel Serial

Team,

My Personnel Serial (here) transitions the discussions we've had over the last two months to an action plan that will:

1) Accelerate the progress we've made in shifting our staff from an "administrative staff" to a "command staff."

2) Redistribute personnel (and resources) down echelon from "tail" to "tooth."

3) Reestablish the virtuous cycle between training (school house), tactical (platform) and technical (maintenance activities and program offices) with the focal point/end user being the deployable unit - ACHIEVING AND SUSTAINING THE REQUIRED OPERATIONAL READINESS OF OUR SHIPS, SUBMARINES, AVIATION SQUADRONS AND EXPEDITIONARY UNITS MUST COME FIRST IN OUR ACTIONS AND BE THE FOCAL POINT OF ALL WE DO.

Although all of the action discussed in the Serial is directed at my staff, we will all need to pull together to ensure the policy changes we're putting in place achieve the intended effects and the personnel/resources that move down-echelon hit the critical targets.

All the best, JCHjr

Commander's Guidance - Follow-up

Team,

I spent my first six months in command of Fleet Forces listening and learning. I learned from you, from my ships, squadrons, and units on the waterfront, and from my staff – at every level.

Based on what you’ve showed me, I worked closely with Admiral Walsh (Commander, Pacific Fleet) and developed courses of action that need to be taken to fix the areas that need immediate attention in our Fleet and prepare our Fleet for the future operational and economic environments we will face.

I have promulgated those courses of action in my Commander’s Guidance and my initial Serials on Anti-terrorism / Force Protection, Command and Control, and Fleet Sustainment.

I did not write and distribute my guidance to be just an interesting read, but rather, to drive needed change throughout USFF. As you heard from Secretary Gates, everything that we are buying costs more; and at the same time, our overall resources are going to decrease. Preparing our Fleet for this new environment and sustaining our Fleet over the coming years is my primary concern.

Because my guidance is intended to drive change in some very important areas, it is extremely important that it is not misinterpreted. It is clearly my responsibility to provide clarity when my guidance is misunderstood.

There was a recent article published in “Inside the Navy” on my Command and Control Serial. In that article, the author summarizes one of my tasks, “By June 30, commanders are instructed to revise Fleet Forces missions, functions and tasks (MFTs) to eliminate the term ‘type command.’” This statement is incorrect.

Admiral Walsh and I are not eliminating Type Commanders, nor are we eliminating the term “type command.” As you can read in my C2 SERIAL, we are eliminating the term “Fleet TYCOM” from USFF’s Missions, Functions, and Tasks.

I understand that many of these issues, especially this one, are considered “inside baseball,” but these issues are also very important because of their impact on our Fleet. That is why my entire C2 SERIAL is focused on re-establishing unambiguous and hierarchal lines of operational control and administrative control (OPCON/ADCON) authority and accountability that reflect core Command and Control principles.


Each Type Commander is, and will continue to be, responsible for generating ready forces and accountable for that mission to their respective Fleet Commander (CPF and CUSFF) – this is as it should be. The issue that both Admiral Walsh and I have with “Fleet TYCOMs” is that their existence creates a situation where a Commander can direct action through policy decisions to Commanders and Commanding Officers in a separate chain of command. Simply, the “Fleet TYCOM” title confuses Command and Control because it implies responsibilities and authorities (i.e. that cut across PACFLT and USFF) that do not, in fact, exist.

I hope that this post adds some clarification to my guidance. My intent is to post more often on my guidance, or more specifically, the actions being taken based on my guidance. My purpose is to keep you better informed and hopefully increase our dialogue, especially where you believe I may have gotten it wrong, or at least, not completely right.

Tomorrow, I am off to spend time with our Sailors and Marines at Fleet Week in New York City. I highly encourage anyone that has the opportunity, especially those who have not experienced a Fleet Week before, to visit New York City during a Fleet Week; it is a wonderful experience for everyone. All the best, JCHjr

Doing Less, But Not Doing Anything Less Well

Team,
Please consider the following comment posted on a private forum re: my post on Commander’s Guidance. I want to share this openly on my blog as I believe the author’s comment reinforces why it is important that we consciously address the impact on our ships of a steadily increasing operational demand and just as steadily increasing pressure on the resources that sustain our forces.

"While the mantra “fewer resources mean that there are things we will do less, but not less well” resonates, there is a fundamental disconnect between that phrase and the reality of what it takes to meet an increased COCOM demand signal while still training our Sailors correctly to perform the missions that a COCOM expects a ship to show up able to do.
If OPTEMPO is up and going up, and resources are scant, reducing the number of missions that a ship needs to train for will create the whitespace needed.
But if the OPTEMPO is up and going up, and resources are scant, reducing the number of training repetitions while not reducing the number of missions that ship needs to train for will create chaos.
Example: Right now a BMD DDG needs to train for 23 missions. Which is the priority? From my time at TYCOM and NFC it seems that there is no priority call either from the COCOMs or 4 star resource providers. A BMD ship still needs to do its MOB-E, ATFP, VBSS, 3M, AAW, Strike, NSFS, EW, ASW, MOB-D, FSO, NAV, Helo Aviation, CCC, Intel, Seamanship, and SAR.
Of course some of those mission areas enable others. But we man our ships like we have already prioritized, but we haven’t. And now the onus is on the COs to decide what they needed to spend their time and manning on.
And then the Navy swoops in, picks up on whatever area was deprioritized and blames the CO.
Not right answer.
We violating the 10/10/80 rule. The rule states that 10% of your people will fail no matter what you do, 10% will succeed no matter what you do, and 80% will succeed with a little guidance and adequate support.
It seems like we are asking all our people to be in that 10% that succeeds no matter what we as a Navy do."

In my guidance I talk about the reality that while fewer resources will lead us to do less, we are not free to do anything less well. Couple that with my direction that we must hold the line on our standards – they never change, regardless of resources – and our only option is to prioritize requirements. Accordingly, I directed my Commanders to ruthlessly prioritize their requirements to achieve assigned missions with their available resources.

This guidance reflects what I believe to be the situation today and is the fundamental reality we will continue to face in the future.

The example in the comment above illustrates what we see when a ship is not adequately resourced to man, train and equip for all potential missions, yet is still expected to achieve them.

Expecting a ship to meet every mission requirement while providing only 70% of the resources necessary is not setting the conditions for success. The CO is placed in an untenable situation; we set the ship and her crew up for future failure. Ultimately, it is my responsibility, working through the chain-of-command, to balance the resources I provide to our ships, squadrons and submarines with the missions I expect those units to be able to perform.

But…our COs also have an obligation to seek the truth and act on it - to honestly assess their ship, take appropriate action, and forward their findings and recommendations up the chain-of-command for the betterment of the force. This feedback is absolutely critical. Decision-making and directing action (command) only achieves the desired outcome if there is a properly functioning feedback loop (control). We have occasionally disassociated command from control with often devastating effects that are difficult to recover from, even over a long period of time.

So we have to ensure we establish an honest flow of communication through the chain-of-command; indeed, it is critical we do this. It is not about whining up or down the chain-of-command – that is, simply complaining about problems without offering any solutions; it is about effective leadership in a culture where we work together to continually improve our ships, our squadrons, and our submarines.

The first step in improving performance is being honest about current performance – we must have the courage to “commit” truth with each other and then go where the facts lead us, while we balance the expectations of our force with the resources we provide the force.
All the best, JCHjr

Anti-terrorism / Force Protection (ATFP) Way Ahead

Team,

My ATFP Serial guidance directed action to assess the effectiveness of our Navy’s ATFP program and identify actions to improve areas that need attention. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the attack on USS COLE. As the CNO’s Executive Agent for ATFP, I have directed a year long series of events to assess our ATFP capability and readiness. In October of this year, we will host a Flag Officer Summit to review what we have learned and identify solutions to our ATFP vulnerabilities. The summit will be followed by a service at the USS COLE memorial where we will honor our 17 fallen shipmates and their families.

The next event starts Monday and continues through the end of next week (22-26 MAR 10). Exercise SOLID CURTAIN-CITADEL SHIELD 2010 (SC-CS10) includes over 250 individual events and represents the largest anti-terrorism exercise conducted by any Service. The exercise will affect all Navy installations, units, activities and Sailors in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

SC-CS10 is a complex, multi-level exercise that encompasses:

• SOLID CURTAIN – A Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted at the Operational Level exercising Navy Force Protection Command and Control.
• CITADEL SHIELD - a simultaneously held Field Training Exercise (FTX) conducted at the Tactical Level that exercises ATFP tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Evaluation data and lessons learned from SC-CS10 and follow-on events will identify gaps and seams that may require material and non-material solutions, and the development/revision of plans, policy, doctrine, and CONOPS. Unless we are able to determine an accurate accounting of where our current Force Protection posture stands we will be unable to develop a cogent and executable action plan to resolve our shortcomings.

Although we have greatly improved our security and force protection over the past ten years, we must always be focused on improving our policies and procedures; we cannot allow ourselves to become complacent. To that end, I want your personal thoughts on the Navy’s ATFP capability and readiness. I would like to know what you think we do well and what we don’t do well.

Remember, there are plenty of people out there who have stated, repeatedly, they want to attack our ships and kill our Sailors. It’s up to us, all of us, to take a cold, hard look at our capabilities and ensure we do whatever it takes to keep our enemies from succeeding. All the best, JCHjr

The Fleet Readiness Enterprise

I recently released my Commander's Guidance followed by SERIALs on Anti-terrorism / Force Protection (ATFP) and Command and Control (C2). Since I released my guidance - specifically my C2 SERIAL - I have been asked how it affects the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE)/Warfare Enterprises.

To answer that question, I think it is important to start with a quick recap of the history and original purpose of the Navy Enterprise. The Navy Enterprise started as Sea Enterprise in 2001, a part of the Sea Power-21 construct, with the purpose of increasing collaboration throughout the Navy to ensure we achieved the most effective and efficient results from the resources we were given. Because of the successes of the Navy Enterprise efforts, the scope was expanded and the Fleet Readiness Enterprise/Warfare Enterprises and the Provider Enterprise were established. One consequence of this expansion was that the Navy Enterprise began to evolve away from a purely behavioral construct and blurred lines of authority and accountability.

For example, in the case of SUBFOR, we effectively eliminated the distinction between SUBFOR and SUBLANT roles by eliminating the SUBLANT title. This action was a clear example of confusing clear command and control between a Commander overseeing enterprise related activity under his enterprise title (SUBFOR) and a TYCOM exercising ADCON authorities. Titles are important because they can result in behavior that is more reflective of title than actual authorities. Similar types of issues exists across all the Warfare Enterprises.

When I took command of Fleet Forces, one of my immediate objectives was to work with PACFLT to reestablish clear lines of authority and accountability (chain-of-command), yet retain the many benefits of the positive collaborative environment created by Fleet Readiness Enterprise/Warfare Enterprises.

Admiral Walsh and I have made two primary changes with regard to the FRE/Warfare Enterprises:

First, we re-chartered the FRE so that it is co-chaired by both Admiral Walsh and me. We also re-focused the FRE on developing integrated solutions on joint USFF and CPF issues for our decision.

Second, we released a joint P4 on "Core Command and Control Principles." This P4 identified time-tested, combat proven, core C2 principles that we need to return to and directed action to solve the issues highlighted above. Most importantly, this P4 also reaffirmed our strong commitment to Enterprise collaboration.

So our intent has never been to eliminate Enterprise behavior or the FRE/Warfare Enterprises - our intent was to clearly differentiate between the FRE goal of collaborative behavior on Navy-wide issues and the enduring requirement for a clear and unambiguous chain-of-command within both US Fleet Forces and the US Pacific Fleet.  All the best, JCHjr.

Commander's Guidance

Team,

Two weeks ago, I released my US Fleet Forces Commander’s Guidance. My guidance reflects what I have learned and how I believe we must proceed to ensure we continue to deliver forces ready for tasking today, sustain those forces into the future, and deploy Sailors who are confident in their abilities to execute their missions.

The purpose of my Commander’s Guidance is to deliver my estimate of the situation, guiding principles, and strategic intent. In addition to my guidance, I have also identified areas that require significant attention and immediate action. My specific direction for these areas will be delivered in the form of SERIALs. My first two SERIALs are “Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection” and “Command and Control.” All of these documents are posted on this website and are available for your review.

In executing my guidance, I have directed my staff to provide me with vigorous feedback - I ask that you do the same. Your observations, insights and comments will provide me an additional assessment to ensure the actions we take have the effects we intend. All the best, JCHjr.