Team,
When I took command of Fleet Forces, one of my immediate objectives was to work with PACFLT to reestablish clear lines of authority and accountability up and down the chain-of-command. A clear and unambiguous chain of command is fundamental to unity of action and requires the strict adherence to time-tested, combat-proven, core command and control principles.
Over the last decade, our Navy pursued efficiency initiatives to reduce the cost of manning, training, equipping and maintaining naval forces that included the establishment of AIRFOR, SURFOR and SUBFOR and the Warfare Enterprises. Although intended as a behavioral model to promote Navy-wide collaboration and coordination within existing chains-of-command, the cumulative effect of these initiatives over time has been to move our Navy away from its core command and control principles, specifically, unity of command.
To correct the problems above and reestablish chains-of-command that conform to core command and control principles, CNO revised the Missions, Functions, and Tasks (MFT) of PACFLT and Fleet Forces.
Admiral Walsh and I released a joint P4 today to explain CNO’s changes to our MFTs and their immediate impact on the Fleet.
I want to discuss two of those changes here to ensure they are not misconstrued in any way.
“Fleet TYCOMS”
Our revised MFTs effectively eliminate the term “Fleet TYCOM” and realigns AIRFOR and SURFOR from Fleet Forces to PACFLT. The benefit of this change is twofold:
First, it removes the parallel chain-of-command that AIRFOR and SURFOR previously had by establishing ADM Walsh at PACFLT as the only reporting senior for both AIRFOR/AIRPAC and SURFOR/SURFPAC.
Second, since naval forces are assigned to individual Type Commanders, only the Type Commanders have the authority to man, train, and equip and maintain assigned forces. Accordingly, AIRPAC, SURFPAC, and SUBLANT will retain their titles as AIRFOR, SURFOR and SUBFOR and will still have the responsibility to develop and coordinate common policies and standards in their respective Fleets; however, implementation of the policy and standards will be done strictly through the individual Type Commanders (e.g. AIRPAC and AIRLANT).
Current AIRFOR, SURFOR and SUBFOR instructions will remain in effect until superseded.
Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE)
The Fleet Readiness Enterprise has been replaced with the Fleet Integration Executive Panel and will be co-chaired by Admiral Walsh and me.
The original intent of the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE) was to optimize the cost-effective delivery of operational forces ready for tasking across the Warfare Enterprises. Since its formation in 2006, the FRE has evolved into an effective integration forum to address cross-Fleet operational and maintenance issues and to articulate joint Fleet requirements to CNO. The revised MFTs recognize the current role of the FRE as an effective Fleet integration forum, and reduces the scope of effort from integration across five Warfare Enterprises to integration across the two Fleets.
I want to be very clear that this revision does not change the assignment of forces, manpower or funding for either PACFLT or Fleet Forces.
This revision provides us with a clear line of authority and accountability from individual units straight up to the Fleet Commanders, who are ultimately responsible for providing them with the training, tools and time needed to deploy with confidence in their ability to accomplish their assigned missions.
There is also no intent or desire to move us back to a “two-Fleet” Navy. These changes ensure PACFLT and Fleet Forces operate from a common baseline defined by Joint policy and Joint standards, but also acknowledges that the Naval environment is not the same in the Atlantic and Pacific so we should not pursue “cookie cutter” solutions to problems that may be unique to each Fleet.
You can read the P4 Admiral Walsh and I released today here.
All the best, JCHjr
05 October 2010
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10 comments:
Sir,
I'm confused about our new chain of command. Have read the 5440.77A and 5450.337A and that really didn't help much. It looks like USFF no longer has any ships and aircraft to man train and equip by the OPNAV instructions. Navy news CHINFO release backs up the new instructions.
This is made all the more confusing by 2nd FLT and JFCOM going away.
Do we answer to PACOM for ship maintenance, training and future planning?
Sir,
Is there a diagram available that will help clarify the changes?
Sir,
Post-XO, post-CSG staff, working at the Pentagon guy here. I read you post and I read the P4.
I don't get it.
V/r,
Jonah said...
Sir, Bravo!!!!! This post should be the next topic of all wardroom training sessions. Hopefully, the readership will understand the difference between an integration-behavior model and the responsibility-authority-accountability model.
Amidst plenty of C2 confusion, this change essentially preserves the goodness of integration of Ech 1-Ech II, Provider-TYCOMs, and CPF-USFF via AIR/SURF/SUB FORs and re-affirms the tried and true C2 (responsibility, authority and accountability) of the Type Commanders--SURFPAC, SURFLANT, AIRPAC, AIRLANT, SUBPAC, SUBLANT.
Great idea getting rid of the "Enterprise" term that unintentionally evolved in degrading C2. In our line of work, accountability for performance must reside with an individual and not a board room.
All units should be able to clearly articulate their administrative C2 structure. Further, with the standdown of C2F, the operational and administrative C2 structures get real simple.
V/R Jonah
As a few have outlined above, unless someone has been soaked in the details of Staff Weenieism for the balance of their careers - they are going to have a very hard time understanding this very important move.
It would be very helpful to all involved if there was a C2 diagram made available - a before and after shot. That way, people who are confused - which would be 98.7% of the people reading the P4, press release, and this blog - could have the C2 diagram in one hand as a guide to understanding the verbiage describing the change.
ADM Harvey, the roll out is not going well. I know the C2 PPT slides are somewhere - if they could be published in a place easy for people to get hold of them - it would bring the level of understanding to a significantly higher level.
As a side note - the sun looked brighter when I saw the term "Enterprise" go. Only one thing in the Navy should have "ENTERPRISE" in its name - and that would be a warship.
And that warship had better be a CVN.
Byron
Sir,
I also don't understand. There is still not a unity of command. The Strike Groups still exist only in the operational chain. This creates a mass of confusion. When an event happens, the Strike Group wants to respond as does the TYCOM, this creates a situation in which the ship feels like it is serving two masters.
The Navy has made the decision to align the PHIBRONs and the DESRONs in both the administrative chain under SURFLANT and the operational chain under C2F yet to administratively align the CSGs/ESG under C2F. Why not align the CSG/ESG ADCON under the TYCOMs and OPCON under the numbered fleet. This would seem to alleviate the feeling of a dual chain and bring even more clarity.
I find the structure as it currently exists to be confusing and duplicative.
Very respectfully,
Team,
Thanks for the comments.
First, I want to tell you up front that the SecDef decision to recommend the disestablishment of JFCOM was an issue completely independent of the changes CNO approved to the CPF/USFF MFTs. These changes were absolutely necessary to clarify Fleet command and control and were not driven by other external events; ADM Walsh and I had been working this issue since October 2009.
Second, the revisions to our MFTs do not change the administrative control (ADCON) for any ship, squadron, submarine, or unit. Each TYCOM is still responsible for manning, training, and equipping those forces previously assigned to them.
So what did change?
First, the responsibilities of AIRFOR, SURFOR, and SUBFOR (previously known as the “Fleet TYCOMs”) have changed from “establishing and implementing policies and requirements” to “developing and coordinating common policy and standards.” I understand that this may be perceived as inside baseball stuff, but it is very important for clarifying command and control and ensuring only one Commander is accountable for his/her forces. “Establishing and implementing policies and requirements” is a method for implementing control. Therefore, all policy must be established and implemented via the chain of command (e.g. USFF to AIRLANT to the USS ENTERPRISE). If a policy is common to both Pacific Fleet and USFF forces, it will be established and implemented as a joint instruction (e.g. AIRPAC/AIRLANT Instruction vice AIRFOR Instruction) to maintain clarity of C2 and accountability.
Second, AIRFOR and SURFOR were ADCON to USFF, this resulted in AIRPAC/AIRFOR and SURPAC/SURFOR reporting to (and taking direction from) two Fleet Commanders. Both Type Commanders now only report to U.S. Pacific Fleet. Because AIRFOR, SURFOR, and SUBFOR are responsible for “developing and coordinating common policy and standards” no forces are assigned to them and, therefore; this change does not affect the assignment of forces as I mentioned previously.
Finally, I agree with CDR Salamander that a visual can be very helpful. And he’s right, we do have some charts that I have posted on my website that I hope you find useful. (http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/Documents/mft_charts.pdf)
Again, thank you for your questions and comments, I hope this helps clear up some of the confusion. All the best, JCHjr
Anonymous (last poster),
You ask a very good question. First, the reason that SURFLANT is assigned ADCON over DESRONs and PHIBRONs, but not CSGs is simply because the composition of the CSG includes forces assigned to different Type Commanders (e.g. AIRLANT for the CVN and AirWing). That is why CSGs are aligned under C2F supported by the Type Commanders.
The second part of your question regarding dual chain of command is a little more complex. There are indeed two types of control as you point out - OPCON and ADCON. Every deployable unit has these two chains of command and is often responsible to two different commanders if OPCON and ADCON do not "flow" through the same commander. The key distinction here is that the type of control exercised by each Commander is different and well defined in joint doctrine. This does not mean that when an event occurs, both Commanders will not be impacted and must be informed by the unit, but the direction given to that unit should not conflict as long as each commander is acting within the limits of his/her authorities.
All the best, JCHjr
Sir, in your opinion who should "own" the CGs in the basic and maintenance phase? Who above the CO is directly responsible for tracking and managing the execution of these phases and the transition to the integrated phase and then deployment? Are TYCOM staffs equipped/manned to manage to the level of detail necessary to track all our premiere Aegis combatants through these phases? Have the strike groups been completely divested of this responsibility?
v/r
Anonymous
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