On 8 May 1942, USS YORKTOWN (CV-5) was severely damaged by the Imperial Japanese Navy during an air attack at the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Japanese left her crippled in the Pacific and reported her off as sunk.
It was during this time that our Navy code breakers intercepted and deciphered Japanese plans to attack at Midway in just a few short weeks. The Japanese anticipated a major Fleet engagement would ensue and they could finish the job they started with the attack on Pearl Harbor – the complete destruction of our Fleet.
Having a good idea of Japanese intentions, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) drew up plans to engage the Japanese in a surprise ambush at Midway. It was clear that Nimitz would need all three of his remaining carriers – ENTERPRISE, HORNET, and YORKTOWN – at Midway to have a chance at winning this fight. Meanwhile, YORKTOWN arrived back at Pearl Harbor badly damaged on 27 May; she would undergo emergency repairs in Dry Dock #1. The initial estimate by our Naval Engineers was that it would take at least three months to get YORKTOWN back in the fight, but Nimitz had other plans. "We must have this ship back in three days," he told the yard manager and workers. The reply was a simple “Yes, Sir” and sure enough, she got underway three days later on 30 May 1942. She joined up with Task Force 17 and then rendezvoused with Task Force 16 northeast of Midway on 2 June where she participated in one of the most decisive naval battles in history. Although YORKTOWN was lost in the fight, she exacted a high price for her sacrifice: the U.S. Navy Carrier Force sank the Japanese Carriers SORYU, AKAGI, KAGA, and HIRYU, and effectively ended the Imperial Japanese Navy’s advance in the Pacific.
The fact that YORKTOWN did not sink at the Battle of the Coral Sea was a testament to those who designed, built, maintained, and operated her. That she was able to fight again four weeks later at Midway was a testament to the Navy engineers, planners, estimators, and shipyard workers who understood that their job was to take broken and damaged ships, repair them, and return them to service ready for combat as quickly as possible. YORKTOWN’s departure from Pearl Harbor on 30 May 1942 remains one of the greatest single industrial achievements of the Second World War, a real tribute to our Naval shipyards and their ability to get it done.
As I reflect on the past and present states of ship repair, I am concerned that some of the organizations in the business of fixing our ships may have lost their sense of urgency and commitment to our required and time-tested standards of technical performance, that they have lost the ability to “get it done,” on time, on budget, and with high quality work. As a result, the Fleets devote a disproportionate amount of repair money to a handful of units and maintenance re-work; we risk our ability to meet near-term operational commitments; we jeopardize the expected service life of ships that should last for 30-35 years; and most importantly, we put an increasing and absolutely unnecessary burden on the backs of our Sailors.
As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, I’ve talked a great deal on this blog and in other forums about the importance of maintaining our standards in everything we do. You can find a few of those posts here, here, here, and here. The fact that today’s conflicts lack the immediacy and intensity of Fleet operations like those during the Second World War should not, and must not, diminish the importance of completing quality repair work on time and on budget. We are operating at a very high tempo; routinely, over half of our Battle Fleet is underway, making way with about 40% of the Fleet forward deployed. Our ship maintenance effort must keep pace.
Even after making allowances for the major differences separating today’s repair industry from the one that existed in 1942 – factors such as the significantly increased complexity of today’s ships, enhanced worker safety provisions, stringent environmental protection and pollution abatement regulations, and all the complexities associated with current government contracting practices – I still strongly believe that today’s waterfront repair efforts can be significantly improved. We must recover the capacity and capabilities that we demonstrated on YORKTOWN in 1942. We must do better…we will do better.
Our Navy and the shipyards have been in this business together for a very long time. I have great confidence in our ability to demonstrate the commitment to technical excellence and superior quality in our shipyards that we have had for so many years. VADM Kevin McCoy and I are in alignment on what we need to do and we’ve set in motion a number of initiatives to improve our maintenance performance. What we need now is the commitment of our waterfront repair professionals – Navy, government civilians and contractors – to do better and return us to the YORKTOWN standard of performance. We did it in May 1942; I know we can do it today.
All the best, JCHjr
9 comments:
Admiral, are you currently in a position to elaborate on what you and VADM McCoy's initiatives will be?
"s", there's a lot to what we're going to be doing so I'll make it the subject of a separate post in the very near future. Sound OK? All the best, JCHjr
Admiral,
I am tired of hearing senior Navy leaders and retired Navy Officers working as contractors continue to perpetuate the idea that our Sailors do not do their PMS and do not maintain our ships. And their answer to this so called problem is to spend more and more money on bringing in assessment teams and audit professionals who will find anything they can to justify their jobs. I wish I heard more about spending more on training our sailors on maintenance to make them more self sufficient. And beefing up the waterfront "maintenance and repair "organizations to work down already extensive CSMPs. When I was a Chief and then an Officer on ships I would rather have labor and part support help to fix what my people already knew was broke but we neither had the training or money to fix THAN TO HAVE ANOTHER ASSESSMENT TEAM COME DOWN TO SHIP WHOM I DID NOT HAVE TIME OR THE PEOPLE TO FOLLOW AROUND FOR A WEEK --- AS THEY WORKED TO FIND MORE PROBLEMS. The people in the Navy today are smart and dedicated and well trained -- leadership needs to redirect their efforts and dollars towards the hard work of fixing what is already known to be wrong and eliminate the increasing numbers of assessments to find hidden failures (that is why you have a preventative maintenance program that has been engineered to meet both the operational and design limitations at a reasonable cost.
There is a much better ROI in fixing known problems than what we are focusing on today.
Admiral, over the past 20 years we have greatly depleted the number of shore billets for our enlisted personnel in waterfront repair and SIMA organizations. The driving factors of course were downsizing and continued lack of funding. But, in doing so, we eliminated a most valuable source of training and experience for our engineers that they could take back with them when they returned to sea ... skills needed to keep our ships and systems in good condition. In addition, our Fleet Review Boards eliminated what they thought were unnecessary and duplicative inspections, policies, and visits. In hindsight, many of those "nuances" kept all of us honest and were a good template and training tool for our cres. We also eliminated a "surge capacity" of skilled, trained and experienced engineers that could be sent anywhere in the world to repair our ships and submarines as needed. There were other secondary consequences as well. For example, by reducing the shore billets and extending sea tours for our engineers, we drove many of them out of the Navy and into work at commercial shipyards as contractors ... who we now pay. The organic capability we dismantled erved us well during WWII and even the Vietnam days. Perhaps it is time to revisit how we could restructure a future ship-shore repair organization in our major port concentration areas that has a 70/30 composition (70% military/30% contractor/GS) so we can rebuild the organic capability needed at sea, attract more Sailors to remain in the Navy and not lose the experience and training we invested in them; and have that "surge capacity" once more to respond to future emergent needs.
ADM, you'd have to get us yardbirds to teach your people how to do it. I wish I was kidding, and I don't mean to be insulting, but the Navy has lost so much institutional knowledge it's not funny. Just the other day I watched an LPO and two second classes trying to figure out where the breakers/switches were so they could tag out a system. Not the first time I've seen this, either. I'm really disappointed that your people have fallen so far; I remember when second and first classes were skilled and with a deep knowledge and chiefs were masters of their art. No longer, sir, no longer. Your people spend far too long on a computer nowadays and too little time crawling around the guts of the ship.
Yes sir, 30 years ago we didn't need all the Class "C" schools, training aids, and brick and mortar training facilities that we have today. We had SIMA's, Tenders, and shipboard hands on "classrooms" that gave our engineers and repair technicians a perpetual loop of sea/shore training and experience, and kept our ships operating.
Admiral,
If there is a reason our sailors do not know how to tag out their equipment and possible even maintain it its because it of the shore based technical support standing by on the pier along with Officers and Chiefs who fail to demand that their people do the work.
It is probably a good thing that the LPO and two second classes were allowed to work out the problem themselves - how else will they learn. There is not better teacher than being told you must do it yourself. It might take longer and there maybe mistakes but the end result will be significant to them and the Navy, especially when they are deployed or in a casualty situation.
As long as expectations are not clear and continuously enforced ships force will never experience true ownership of their ship. True ownerships comes with the accomplishments and the pride derived from accomplishing difficult tasks on their own. I thought we learned this process during WWII and through out the cold war.
Admiral,
I look forward to your next post on The CFFC & NAVSEA Initiatives. As a Long time follower of your blog, I re-read all of the "here, here & here" articles and comments and they are a continuing theme of initiatives that bring more assessment organizations and increased staffs of civilians. As many state and as You and I have discussed in years past, we need the sailors back in SIMAs enmasse to reestablish that cadre of maintenance expertise with a good sea-shore rotation in their respective homports. Hopefully the billets assigned to IA slots can be dedicated to bringing our maintenance billets at SIMAs back up to strength where we can rebuild of onboard expertise and repair experience. It took a long time to destroy that wonderful capability and hopefully you can start restoration before you drop anchor in the retired ranks. Best of luck.
V/R
Retired 0-6
Retired O-6, I should have the initiatives follow-up post I discussed earlier ready later this week. All the best, JCHjr
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